Iloilo Jar Coporation vs Comglasco Corporation, 815 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 219509, January 18, 2017
Subject: Obligations and Contracts
FACTS
On
August 16, 2000, petitioner Iloilo Jar Corporation (Iloilo Jar), as lessor, and
respondent Comglasco Corporation/Aguila Glass (Comglasco), as lessee, entered
into a lease contract over a portion of a warehouse building. The term of the
lease was for a period of three (3) years or until August 15, 2003.
On
December 1, 2001, Comglasco requested for the pre-termination of the lease
effective on the same date. Iloilo Jar, however, rejected the request on the
ground that the pre-termination of the lease contract was not stipulated
therein. Despite the denial of the request for pre-termination, Comglasco still
removed all its stock, merchandise and equipment from the leased premises on
January 15, 2002. From the time of the withdrawal of the equipment, and
notwithstanding several demand letters, Comglasco no longer paid all rentals
accruing from the said date.
On
September 14, 2003, Iloilo Jar sent a final demand letter to Comglasco, but it
was again ignored. Consequently, Iloilo Jar filed a civil action for breach of
contract and damages before the RTC on October 10, 2003.
On
June 28, 2004, Comglasco filed its Answer and raised an affirmative defense,
arguing that by virtue of Article 1267 of the Civil Code, it was released from
its obligation from the lease contract. It explained that the consideration
thereof had become so difficult due to the global and regional economic crisis
that had plagued the economy. Likewise, Comglasco admitted that it had removed
its stocks and merchandise but it did not refuse to pay the rentals because the
lease contract was already deemed terminated. Further, it averred that though
it received the demand letters, it did not amount to a refusal to pay the rent
because the lease contract had been pre-terminated in the first place.
ISSUE
Whether
or not petitioner’s contention has merit.
RULING
No.
Under
Art. 1267, when the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond
the contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom,
in whole or in part. However, the court ruled that the article applies to
obligations to do and not to obligations to give.
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