Case Digest: In re Edillon 84 SCRA 554

In re Edillon 84 SCRA 554

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

Atty. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. In 1975, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” notwithstanding due notice pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.

In his pleadings, conceded to the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, but questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Edillon be disbarred for refusal to pay his membership dues” notwithstanding due notice pursuant to the by-Laws of the IBP.

RULING

Yes. Atty. Edillon is disbarred for refusal to pay his membership dues” notwithstanding due notice pursuant to the by-Laws of the IBP.

 

Under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law."

In this case, SC sees nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Such compulsion is justified as a valid exercise of the police power of the State over an important profession.