In Re Montague &Dominguez, G.R. No. 1107, April 2, 1904
Subject: Basic Legal Ethics
FACTS
On or about the 15th day of
November, 1902, the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands presented to the
Supreme Court of said Islands a petition, and on or about January 15, 1903, a
supplemental petition, alleging that Augustus A. Montagne and Frank E.
Dominguez were practicing attorneys at law in the courts of said Islands, and
were members of the firm of lawyers known as Montagne & Dominguez; and in
said petition and supplemental petition the said Attorney-General charged said
lawyers and said firm with having violated their oaths of office as attorneys
at law and with failure to faithfully perform the duties of their office as
such attorneys toward their clients.
This evidence is so voluminous that
nothing more can be incorporated in the space given us to this opinion than a
brief reference to it, and even that reference is to be confined to the facts
of four of the most serious of the charges against the respondents, viz, the
"Balmori" charge, the hacienda "Esperanza" charge, the
"Cordona" charge, and the "Sarmiento" charge. These
charges, and a brief statement of the evidence to sustain them, are as follows:
1) That the respondents accepted employment in February
1902, to represent one Felix Balmori in a criminal case, on appeal to the
Supreme Court, receiving a retainer in said case; and that after entering upon
such employment and accepting a fee pursuant thereto, they abandoned and
deserted their said client’s case, to his great prejudice;
2) That they entered into a contract of employment with
thousands of Filipinos in the Province of Pangasinan, in December, 1901, to
represent said inhabitants in a suit or suits involving the title and
possession to a large tract of land, and, after accepting retainers from their
said clients, and rendering certain professional services in connection with
such suits, they deserted and abandoned their clients' cases at a critical
time, in violation of their contract, and to the great injury of such clients;
3) That they were retained in October 1901, to defend one
Juan Cardona, who was then held as a prisoner on a criminal charge in the
Province of Tarlac. The accused received from Cardona a retainer in his case
and afterwards deserted him and failed to appear for him in court when his case
was called for trial;
4) That they undertook, in November, 1901, the defense of
one Ramon Sarmiento, who was charged with the crimes of estafa and
falsification, and who was imprisoned on those charges in Manila; that though
they were paid 500 pesos for their services, they subsequently, on an order of
the court, obtained possession of 300 pesos which had been deposited in court
as the money of said Sarmiento, and retained said sum of 300 pesos and
appropriated it to their own use and benefit, against the instructions of their
said client and to his injury;
5) That in seven other cases, called the " Cuyapo
" case, the " Pearsons " case, the " Dorr " case, the
" Gleason " case, the " Finnick " case, the " Quiao
" case, and the " Mauline " case, the accused, as such
attorneys, at various times mentioned in said petitions, after being employed
and retained by clients, and after, receiving fees from their clients, abandoned
their cases, and failed and neglected to render such faithful services for said
clients as the law required.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondents should
be disbarred.
RULING
SC held that there should be added
to these latter five charges those against the respondents in the "
Pearson " case and in the " Mauline " case, thus making in all
seven charges, no one of which is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment, and these seven charges are therefore dismissed.
Articles 356 and 357 of the Penal
Code provide, in effect, for the punishment by a fine of an attorney who
maliciously abuses his profession, or by inexcusable ignorance or negligence prejudices
his client; and provide for punishment by-fine and suspension, in case an
attorney having been retained to defend the cause of one party, subsequently
without his consent, defends the opposite side in the same action.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as lawyer, by the Supreme Court, for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for violation of the oaths prescribed in
section 18, or for the willful disobedience of any lawful order of the Supreme
Court or Courts of First Instance, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as a
lawyer for a party, to an action or proceeding without authority so to do.
It will be noticed that under
article 356 of the Penal Code the penalty for a violation of that article is a
fine only; and, under article 357, a fine and suspension may be imposed only
for one cause, viz, when an attorney is retained by one party and subsequently,
and without the consent of that party, defends the opposite side in the same
action.
In re Percy (36 N. Y., 651) the
court went so far as to hold that inasmuch as the right to admission to
practice law depended on good moral character, joined with requisite learning,
this character should be preserved after admission; and that where the acts of
an attorney were such as to destroy his credibility and character, the court
had authority to disbar him.
Inasmuch as in the case at bar the
charges and proofs do not show that the practices of the respondents
constituted the gravest offends, we are inclined to take a lenient view of the
charges. While we can not excuse the respondents, yet we are of opinion that
total disbarment would be too severe a penalty for their acts.
The court, therefore, is of opinion
that the respondents, Augustus A. Montagne and Frank E. Dominguez, should be
suspended from the practice of their profession as lawyers in these Islands for
a term of one year.
