Case Digest: Bascos v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 318, G.R. No. 101089

Bascos v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 318, G.R. No. 101089, April 7, 1993

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE) entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corp whereby CIPTRADE bound itself to haul JIBFAIR’s 2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal to the warehouse in Calamba, Laguna. To carry out its obligation, CIPTRADE, through Cipriano, subcontracted with Bascos to transport and to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal from the Manila Port Area to Calamba, Laguna. BASCOS failed to deliver the said cargo. As a consequence of that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency the amount of the lost goods in accordance with their contract.

Cipriano demanded reimbursement from Bascos but the latter refused to pay. Eventually, Cipriano filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages with writ of preliminary attachment for breach of a contract of carriage. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary attachment. In her answer, Bascos interposed the defense that there was no contract of carriage since CIPTRADE leased her cargo truck to load the cargo from Manila Port Area to Laguna and that the truck carrying the cargo was hijacked and being a force majeure, exculpated petitioner from any liability.

After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano and against Bascos ordering the latter to pay the former for actual damages for attorney’s fees and cost of suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

ISSUE

1.     Whether or not Bascos was a common carrier

2.     Whether or not the hijacking referred to a force majeure

RULING

1.     Yes. Bascos was a common carrier.

Under the law, a common carrier is a person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. In addition, the test to determine a common carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted.

In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are conclusive, and no evidence is required to prove the same. The law makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a “sideline”), neither does said provision distinguishes between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. Therefore, Basco is a common carrier.

2.   No, SC affirmed the holding of the respondent court that the loss of the goods was not due to force majeure.

Under the law, a common carrier is held responsible — and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility — even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.

In this case, to establish grave and irresistible force, petitioner presented her accusatory affidavit, Jesus Bascos' affidavit, and Juanito Morden's "Salaysay". Affidavits are not considered the best evidence if the affiants are available as witnesses. The subsequent filing of the information for carnapping and robbery against the accused named in said affidavits did not necessarily mean that the contents of the affidavits were true because they were yet to be determined in the trial of the criminal cases. The presumption of negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's burden to overcome it. Thus, contrary to her assertion, private respondent need not introduce any evidence to prove her negligence. Her own failure to adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence made the presumption conclusive against her. Therefore, the hijacking was not force majure; there was lack of conclusive evidence to prove it was.