Case Digest: Benedicto v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 187 SCRA 547, G.R. No. 70876

Benedicto v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 187 SCRA 547, G.R. No. 70876, 19 July 1990.

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

The petitioner, Ma. Luisa Benedicto, was the registered owner of a cargo truck that was used to transport sawn lumber from Greenhills Wood Industries Company, Inc. to Blue Star Mahogany, Inc. The driver of the truck, Virgilio Licuden, was not an employee of Benedicto, but of Benjamin Tee, to whom Benedicto had sold the truck on an installment basis.

The truck never arrived at Blue Star Mahogany, and the sawn lumber was never delivered. Greenhills Wood Industries filed a civil case against Benedicto for the recovery of the value of the lost sawn lumber.

Benedicto denied liability, arguing that she was no longer the owner of the truck at the time of the loss. However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals both ruled in favor of Greenhills Wood Industries.

ISSUE

Whether or not Benedicto, being the registered owner of the carrier, should be held liable for the value of the undelivered or lost sawn lumber.

RULING

Yes.

Under the law, the registered owner is liable for the consequences from the operations of the carrier, even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been transferred to another person. This doctrine rests upon the principle that in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume that the registered owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof.

In this case, it would be very difficult and often impossible as a practical matter, for members of the general public to enforce the rights of action that they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated if they should be required to prove who the actual owner is. Therefore, Greenhills is not required to go beyond the vehicle’s certificate of registration to ascertain the owner of the carrier.

Case Digest: BA Finance v. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 715, G.R. No. 98275

BA Finance v. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 715, G.R. No. 98275, 13 November 1992.

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

On March 6, 1983, an accident occurred involving BA FINANCE CORPORATION Isuzu ten-wheeler truck then driven by an employee of Lino Castro.

Rogelio Villar y Amare, the driver of the Isuzu truck, was at fault when the mishap occurred in as much as he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide with multiple physical injuries with damage to property of the RTC at Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner was adjudged liable for damages in as much as the truck was registered in its name during the incident in question.

Petitioner asseverates that it should not have been haled to court and ordered to respond for the damage in the manner arrived at by both the trial and appellate courts since the complaint lodged by the plaintiffs would indicate the petitioner was not the employer of the negligent driver who was under the control and supervision of Lino Castro at the time of the accident, apart from the fact that the Isuzu truck was in the physical possession of Rock Component Philippines by virtue of the lease agreement.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner can be held responsible to the victim albeit the truck was leased to Rock Component Philippines when the incident occurred.

RULING

Yes, BA Finance Corporation is liable.

The Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992, as amended) provides that the vehicle may be used or operated upon any public highway unless the same is properly registered. It has been stated that the system of licensing and the requirement that each machine must carry a registration number, conspicuously displayed, is one of the precautions taken to reduce the danger of injury of pedestrians and other travelers from the careless management of automobiles, and to furnish a means of ascertaining the identity of persons violating the laws and ordinances, regulating the speed and operation of machines upon the highways.

Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway, the main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.

In this case, the petitioner being the registered owner of the vehicle is liable. The law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve the registered owner directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or consequence of registration. Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done.

Case Digest: Singson v. CA, G.R. No. 11999

Singson v. CA, G.R. No. 119995. Nov. 18, 1997

Subject: Transportation Law

 

FACTS

Carlos Singson, purchased a round trip ticket from Cathay Pacific Airways, Inc. (Cathay) to the United States. The ticket was open-dated, meaning that Singson could use it to travel at any time.

Singson and his cousin left Manila on June 6, 1988 and arrived safely in Los Angeles. They stayed in the United States for three weeks and decided to return to the Philippines on July 1, 1988.

When Singson went to Cathay's office to confirm his return flight reservation, he was informed that his ticket was missing flight coupon No. 5. Cathay refused to confirm his reservation without the missing coupon.

Singson explained to Cathay that he had not used the missing coupon and that it must have been lost. However, Cathay refused to listen to him. Singson was forced to purchase a new ticket to the Philippines.

Singson filed a complaint against Cathay for breach of contract of carriage. He alleged that Cathay had a duty to transport him back to the Philippines, even if his ticket was missing a coupon.

The trial court ruled in favor of Singson and awarded him damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not a breach of contract was committed by CATHAY when it failed to confirm the booking of petitioner for its 1 July 1988 flight.

RULING

Yes, a breach of contract was committed by CATHAY when it failed to confirm the booking of petitioner for its 1 July 1988 flight.

Under the law, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

In this case, CATHAY undoubtedly committed a breach of contract when it refused to confirm petitioner's flight reservation back to the Philippines on account of his missing flight coupon. Its contention that there was no contract of carriage that was breached because petitioner's ticket was open-dated is untenable. To begin with, the round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete written contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It has all the elements of a complete written contract. In fact, the contract of carriage in the instant case was already partially executed as the carrier complied with its obligation to transport the passenger to his destination, i.e., Los Angeles. Only the performance of the other half of the contract — which was to transport the passenger back to the Philippines — was left to be done. Hence, petitioner was not a mere “chance passenger with no superior right to be boarded on a specific flight,” as erroneously claimed by CATHAY.  The loss of the coupon was attributed to the negligence of CATHAY's agents and was the proximate cause of the non-confirmation of petitioner's return flight on 1 July 1988. It virtually prevented petitioner from demanding the fulfillment of the carrier's obligations under the contract. To hold that no contractual breach was committed by CATHAY and totally absolve it from any liability would in effect put a premium on the negligence of its agent, contrary to the policy of the law requiring common carriers to exercise extraordinary diligence.

Case Digest: Air France v. Rafael Carrascoso and CA, GR No. L-21438

Air France v. Rafael Carrascoso and CA, GR No. L-21438, Sept 28, 1966

Subject: Transportation Law

 

FACTS

Rafael Carrascoso (Carrascoso) saw a Pilgrim that left Manila for Lourdes. Air France, through his authorized agent, Philippine Airlines (PAL) issued a first class ticket to Carrascoso destined from Manila to Rome. Already seated, the manager of the airline forced Carrascoso to vacate his first class seat and to move to tourist as a white man would be replacing him in his seat as he allegedly had a better right. The incident was witnessed by Ernesto Cuento (Cuento). Carrascoso was reluctant to part with his seat however, he was forced to vacate after a heated argument, and thus suffered humiliation and embarrassment. Not wanting to experience another set of inconveniences, he instead rode with Pan American Airlines for the return trip.

ISSUE

Whether Air France is liable for damages upon breach of contract of carriage.

RULING

Yes, Air France is liable for damages.

Under the law, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

In this case, evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith. Carrascoso was removed from his seat and was transferred to a tourist class seat against his when the defendant’s employee considered the white man has the better right to the first-class seat even though Carrascoso has paid for a first-class ticket. Plaintiff contends that he suffered anxiety, shame and social humiliation from the incident. SC held that the contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Case Digest: F. G. U. Insurance vs. G. P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation, 386 SCRA 312

F. G. U. Insurance vs. G. P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation, 386 SCRA 312, August 6, 2002

Subject: Transportation Law

 

FACTS

G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver thirty units of Condura white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While the truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.

FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS. Since the trucking company failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the Regional Trial Court, which dismissed the case on the basis that GPS is not a common carrier. Thus, the laws governing the contract between the owner of the cargo to whom the plaintiff was subrogated and the owner of the vehicle which transports the cargo are the laws on obligation and contract of the Civil Code as well as the law on quasi delicts.

ISSUE

Whether or not GPS is a common carrier.

RULING

No, GPS is a private carrier.

Under the law, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or good or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.

In this case, GPS being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier but rather a private carrier. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term common carrier.

Case Digest: Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc., v. CA, G.R. No. 147246

Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc., v. CA, G.R. No. 147246. Aug. 19, 2003

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Wheat in bulk was shipped by Marubeni American Corporation to General Milling Corporation in Manila, insured by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The cargo was transferred to Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc., contracted by the consignee as carrier. However, the cargo did not reach its destination due to a typhoon warning. The barge was pulled to Engineering Island, developed a list, and ran aground at Sta. Mesa spillways. A portion of the goods was transferred to three other barges to avoid sinking. The barge broke, sank completely, and the private respondent indemnified the consignee. The private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of indemnity, attorney's fees, and cost of suit. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the private respondent, but the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming it is not a common carrier.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner is a common carrier, thus, liable for the goods lost.

RULING

Yes, the petitioner is a common carrier.

Under the law, common carriers as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. The test to determine a common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted."

In this case, the principal business of the petitioner is that of lighterage and drayage and it offers its barges to the public for carrying or transporting goods by water for compensation. Petitioner is clearly a common carrier. Furthermore, SC held that the petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather than scheduled manner, and with an only limited clientele. A common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or issue tickets.

Case Digest: National Steel Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 112287

National Steel Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 112287. Dec. 12, 1997; 347 Phil. 345

Subject: Transportation Law

 

FACTS

In July 1974, the National Steel Corporation (NSC) and Vlasons Shipping, Inc. (VSI) entered into a Contract of Voyage Charter Hire, hiring VSI's vessel MV "VLASONS I" for a voyage to transport steel products from Iligan City to North Harbor, Manila, under specific terms and conditions. The contract included provisions about cargo, freight, laydays, loading/discharge rates, insurance, and other terms. The contract also incorporated terms from the NANYOZAI Charter Party, which specified that the charterer (NSC) was responsible for loading, stowing, and discharging the cargo.

In August 1974, MV "VLASONS I" loaded the cargo as per the contract's terms in Iligan City. When the cargo was unloaded in Manila in August 1974, it was discovered that a significant portion of the cargo, particularly tinplates and hot rolled sheets, was wet and rusty. NSC filed a claim for damages against VSI, alleging that VSI's negligence and failure to ensure the vessel's seaworthiness had caused the damage to the cargo.

VSI denied liability, asserting that the vessel was seaworthy, and the damage to the cargo was due to the inherent characteristics of the goods, negligence of the stevedores during unloading, and adverse weather conditions encountered during the voyage. VSI also had counterclaims for unpaid charter hire and demurrage charges due to delays in unloading.

The trial court found that the vessel was seaworthy and properly equipped, the cargo damage was not VSI's fault, and the charterer (NSC) was responsible for loading and unloading, absolving VSI of liability. The court also ruled in favor of VSI's counterclaims for unpaid charter hire and reduced the demurrage charges.

The Court of Appeals modified the decision, reducing the demurrage charges further but eliminating the award of attorney's fees and expenses. NSC and VSI both filed petitions for review with this Court, leading to the consolidation of the cases.

ISSUE

Whether or not the vessel MV Vlasons I is a common carrier.

RULING

No, MV Vlasons I is a private carrier.

Under the law, a common carrier as "persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public." It has been held that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it has space, for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. A carrier which does not qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier. "Generally, private carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry goods for the general public. The most typical, although not the only form of private carriage, is the charter party, a maritime contract by which the charterer, a party other than the shipowner, obtains the use and service of all or some part of a ship for a period of time or a voyage or voyages."

In this case, it is undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to the general public. It carried passengers or goods only for those it chose under a "special contract of charter party." As correctly concluded by the Court of Appeals, the MV Vlasons I "was not a common but a private carrier." Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC, including their respective liability for damage to the cargo, are determined primarily by stipulations in their contract of private carriage or charter party.