Case Digest: Tan vs Del Rosario, Jr., 237 SCRA 324,333-336, G.R. No. 109289

Tan vs Del Rosario, Jr., 237 SCRA 324,333-336 (1994), G.R. No. 109289 October 3, 1994

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

Two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and the validity of Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.

Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of the amendatory legislation.

Petitioners contend that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

1) Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

2) Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

3) Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually reads: “An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,” as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme violates due process and is thus unconstitutional. 

2. Whether or not public respondents have exceeded their authority in promulgating Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, to carry out Republic Act No. 7496.

RULING

1. No. SC held that the plea of petitioner to have the law declared unconstitutional for being violative of due process is not tenable. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident in this case.

Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation. The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to have been sufficiently met.

SC further held that the contention clearly forgets that such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496.

Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.

SC add that where a tax measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for, despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot override constitutional proscriptions. This stage, however, has not been demonstrated to have been reached within any appreciable distance in this controversy.

2. No. Section 6 of Revenue Regulation No. 2-93 did not alter, but merely confirmed, the above standing rule as now so modified by Republic Act No. 7496 on basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual income taxpayers on their non-compensation income. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general professional partnership.

Case Digest: Phil Lawyer’s Association vs Agrava 105 Phil 173, G.R. No. L-12426

Phil Lawyer’s Association vs Agrava 105 Phil 173 (1959), G.R. No. L-12426, February 16, 1959

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, the respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

ISSUE

Whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, constitutes or is included in the practice of law?

RULING

YES. The Supreme Court held that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

In this case, respondent Director is prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.

Case Digest: Cayetano vs Monsod, 2-1 SCRA 210, G.R. No. 100113

Cayetano vs Monsod, 2-1 SCRA 210 (1991), G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondent possesses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

RULING

Yes.  Practice of   law   is not limited to the conduct of cases or   litigation   in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.

In the instant case, Atty. Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960. He has been a due paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Atty. Monsod’ s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer legislator of both the rich and the poor, verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Case Digest: Ulep vs Legal Clinic, Inc. 223 SCRA 378 (1993), Bar Matter No. 553

Ulep vs Legal Clinic, Inc. 223 SCRA 378 (1993), Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

Mauricio C. Ulep, a lawyer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court of the Philippines against The Legal Clinic, Inc., a non-lawyer entity that was advertising legal services. Ulep alleged that the Legal Clinic's advertisements were champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. Atty. Ulep, alleged that, the Legal Clinic's advertisements were champertous because they solicited clients by promising to obtain favorable results in their cases.

The Legal Clinic's advertisements were unethical because they implied that the Legal Clinic was staffed by lawyers, when in fact it was not. The Legal Clinic's advertisements were demeaning of the law profession because they made it appear that anyone could practice law, regardless of their training or qualifications. The Legal Clinic's advertisements were destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar because they created the impression that lawyers were no longer necessary to obtain legal representation.

ISSUE

Whether or not the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility.

RULING

YES. Under Rule 2.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business”

The Code of Professional responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified, and objective information or statement of facts. It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skills. Law is a profession and not a trade. The Supreme Court noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The canon of the profession tells us that the best advertisement possible for a lawyer is a well merited reputation for a professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.

In this case, the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of the profession, thus, respondent Legal Clinic, Inc. is restrained and enjoined from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition.

Case Digest: In Re Integration of the Phil. Bar 49 SCRA 22 (1973)

In Re Integration of the Phil. Bar 49 SCRA 22 (1973), January 9, 1973

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda.

In 1970, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor."

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar.

RULING

Yes.

Under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law."

In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Case Digest: Alawi vs. Alauya, 268 SCRA 628, A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P

Alawi vs. Alauya, 268 SCRA 628 (1997), A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

Alawi was a sales representative of a real estate company. Alauya (clerk of court of shaira district) entered a contract with her to buy a housing unit through installment. However, due to some issues involving trust and confidence in Alawi, Alauya wrote letters to the real estate company for the termination of the contract.

According to him, the contract was based on deceit, fraud and the like, making the contract ab initio.  Upon hearing the letters sent to the company, Alawi filed a complaint against Alauya regarding the libelous charges without even a solid ground. She also manifested that Alauya used the title of “ATTORNEY” which only regular members of the bar may use.  Alauya justified the use of the title attorney by asserting that it was “lexically synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law”, which Sharia lawyers shall use. He does not want to use counsellor because people mistakenly understood it as “konsehal/councilor”, who are members of the local legislature.

ISSUE

Whether or not, Alauya, being a member of Shaira Bar, may use the title Attorney?

RULING

No. The court held that only those who have passed the Philippine Bar and have been admitted to the practice of law in the Philippines may use the title "attorney."

In this case, the Court also held that Alauya's use of the title "attorney" was misleading and could have caused harm to Alawi's business. Those who passed Sharia Bar are not full-pledged lawyers and shall practice law before Shaira Courts. “Counsellors-at-law” does not allow him to use the title of “Attorney”. Title of atty is reserved only to those who passed the bar exams and were admitted to the IBP.

Case Digest: Cui vs. Cui, 11 SCRA 755, G.R. No. L-18727

Cui vs. Cui, 11 SCRA 755, G.R. No. L-18727, August 31, 1964

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili was a charitable institution founded by Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. The institution was administered by a board of trustees, which was composed of the nephews of Don Pedro and Doña Benigna. The plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, was a member of the board of trustees. He was also the incumbent administrator of the institution.

On February 27, 1960, the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, entered into a "convenio" with the former administrator, Dr. Fernando Cui. Under the convenio, the defendant agreed to assume the position of administrator of the institution. The plaintiff was not a party to the convenio. The plaintiff filed a quo warranto action against the defendant, challenging his right to hold the position of administrator. The plaintiff alleged that he was the incumbent administrator and that the defendant had no right to assume the position.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court found that the defendant had no right to assume the position of administrator without the consent of the board of trustees. The court also found that the defendant's assumption of the position was in violation of the terms of the deed of donation that established the institution.

ISSUE

Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio

RULING

Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.

Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio. The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.