Case Digest: ICTS vs. Prudential Guarantee, 320 SCRA 244, G.R. No. 134514

 

ICTS vs. Prudential Guarantee, 320 SCRA 244, G.R. No. 134514, December 8, 1999

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Mother vessel Tao He loaded and received on board in San Francisco, California, a shipment of five lots of canned foodstuff complete and in good order and condition for transport to Manila in favor of Duel Food Enterprises (consignee) under “shipper’s load and count”.

The shipment arrived at the port of Manila and discharged by the vessel MS Wei He in favor of ICTSI for safekeeping. The brokerage withdrew the shipment and delivered the same to the consignee. An inspection there revealed that 161 cartoons were missing valued at P85,984.40. Consignee learned of such shortage on June 4, 1990. It filed claim for loss on October 2, 1990. Claim for indemnification of the loss having been denied by ICTSI and the brokerage, consignee sought payment from Prudential (insurer) under the marine cargo policy.

The appellate court found ICTSI negligent in its duty to exercise due diligence over the shipment. It also ruled that the filing of a claim depended on the issuance of a certificate of loss by ICTSI based on the liability clause printed on the back of the arrastre and wharfage receipt. Since ICTSI did not issue such a certificate despite being informed of the shortage, the 15-day period given to the consignee for filing a formal claim never began. Prudential, therefore can hold the ICTSI liable for the shortage.

ISSUE/S

1) Whether or not ICTSI negligent in its duty to exercise due diligence over the shipment. 

2) Whether or not the consignee fail to file a formal claim within the period stated on the dorsal side of the arrastre and wharfage receipt. 

RULING

1)  No. The consigned goods were shipped under “shipper’s load and count”. This means that the shipper was solely responsible for the loading of the container, while the carrier was oblivious to the contents of the shipment. Protection against pilferage of the shipment was the consignee’s lookout. The arrastre operator was not required to verify the contents of the container received and to compare them with those declared by the shipper because as earlier stated, the cargo was at the shipper’s load and count. In this case, the arrastre operator was expected to deliver to the consignee only the container received from the carrier. The legal relationship between the arrastre and consignee is akin to that between a warehouseman and a depositor. As to both the nature of the functions and the place of their performance, arrastre operator’s services are clearly not maritime in character.

2)  Yes. In order to hold the arrastre operator liable for lost or damaged goods, the claimant should file with the operator a claim for the value of said goods “within the 15-day period from the date of discharge of the last package from the carrying vessel.” The filing within the period is in the nature of a prescriptive period for bringing an action and is a condition precedent to holding the arrastre operator liable. In an endeavor to promote fairness, equity and justness, however, a long line of cases has held that the 15-day period for filing claims should be counted from the date the consignee learns of the loss, damage or misdelivery of goods.

In this case, by the time the claim for the loss was filed on October 2, 1990, four months had already elapsed from the date of delivery. In any event, within 15 days from the time the loss was discovered, the consignee could have filed a provisional claim, which would have constituted substantial compliance with the rule. Its failure to do so relieved the arrastre operator of any liability for the non-delivery of the goods. The rationale between the time limit is that, without it, a consignee could too easily concoct or fabricate claims and deprive the arrastre operator of the best opportunity to prove immediately their veracity.

Case Digest: Sabena Belgian vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 38, G.R. No. 104685

 

Sabena Belgian vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 38, G.R. No. 104685, March 14, 1996

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

On August 21, 1987, plaintiff was a passenger on board Flight SN 284 of defendant airline originating from Casablanca to Brussels, Belgium on her way back to Manila. Plaintiff checked in her luggage which contained her valuables, namely: jewelry valued at $2,350.00; clothes $1,500.00 shoes/bag $150; accessories $75; luggage itself $10.00; or a total of $4,265.00, for which she was issued Tag No. 71423. She stayed overnight in Brussels and her luggage was left on board Flight SN 284.

Plaintiff arrived at Manila International Airport on September 2, 1987 and immediately submitted her Tag No. 71423 to facilitate the release of her luggage but the luggage was missing. She was advised to accomplish and submit a property Irregularity Report which she submitted and filed on the same day.

She followed up her claim on September 14, 1987 but the luggage remained to be missing.

On September 15, 1987, she filed her formal complaint with the office of Ferge Massed, defendant's Local Manager, demanding immediate attention.

On September 30, 1987, on the occasion of plaintiffs following up of her luggage claim, she was furnished copies of defendant's telexes with an information that the Burssel's Office of defendant found the luggage and that they have broken the locks for identification. Plaintiff was assured by the defendant that it has notified its Manila Office that the luggage will be shipped to Manila on October 27, 1987. But unfortunately plaintiff was informed that the luggage was lost for the second time.

At the time of the filing of the complaint, the luggage with its content has not been found.

Plaintiff demanded from the defendant the money value of the luggage and its contents amounting to $4,265.00 or its exchange value, but defendant refused to settle the claim.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner is liable for the loss even though respondent was not able to declare the valuables.

RULING

Yes, the petitioner is liable for the loss even though the respondent was not able to declare the valuables. 

Under the law that from the very nature of their business and by reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. This extraordinary responsibility, according to Art. 1736, lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of and received by the carrier until they are delivered actually or constructively to the consignee or person who has the right to receive them. Art. 1737 states that the common carrier's duty to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit. And Art. 1735 establishes the presumption that if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they had observed extraordinary diligence

In this case, remained undisputed that private respondent's luggage was lost while it was in the custody of petitioner. Given all the facts, SC sustained the trial court’s finding that the petitioner is ultimately guilty of "gross negligence" in the handling of private respondent's luggage. The "loss of said baggage not only once but twice. It underscores the wanton negligence and lack of care on the part of the carrier.

Case Digest: PAL vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 48 / 257 SCRA 33

 

PAL vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 48 / 257 SCRA 33

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

On January 27, 1990, plaintiff Gilda C. Mejia shipped thru defendant, Philippine Airlines, one (1) unit microwave oven, with a gross weight of 33 kilograms from San Francisco, U.S.A. to Manila, Philippines. Upon arrival, however, of said article in Manila, Philippines, plaintiff discovered that its front glass door was broken and the damage rendered it unserviceable. Demands both oral and written were made by plaintiff against the defendant for the reimbursement of the value of the damaged microwave oven, and transportation charges paid by plaintiff to defendant company. But these demands fell on deaf ears.

On September 25, 1990, plaintiff Gilda C. Mejia filed the instant action for damages against defendant in the lower court.

In its answer, defendant Airlines alleged inter alia, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the court has no jurisdiction over the case; that plaintiff has no valid cause of action against defendant since it acted only in good faith and in compliance with the requirements of the law, regulations, conventions and contractual commitments; and that defendant had always exercised the required diligence in the selection, hiring and supervision of its employees.

After trial, the Lower Court rendered decision in favor of Gilda C. Mejia. Upon appeal, the Appellate Cour affirmed the lower court decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not PAL is liable for the damaged cargo. 

RULING

Yes, PAL is liable for the damaged cargo. 

Under the Warsaw Convention, carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of destruction or loss of or of damage to any registered luggage or nay goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the carriage by air.

In this case, the damaged oven of Mejia took place during the carriage of PAL. Although the airway bill is binding between the parties, the liability of Pal is not limited on the provisions of the airway bill. Thus, PAL is liable for the damaged cargo.

Case Digest: American Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 482

 

American Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 482

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Democrito Mendoza purchased a conjunction ticket from Singapore Airlines for a multi-leg trip. In Geneva, Mendoza decided to skip Copenhagen and fly directly to New York. He exchanged the unused portion of his ticket for a one-way ticket from Geneva to New York with American Airlines.

Mendoza filed a lawsuit against American Airlines in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for damages before the regional trial court of Cebu for the alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva Airport.

The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of Philippine courts to entertain the said proceedings under Art. 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention. The trial court denied the motion. CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

The petitioner asserts that the Philippines is neither the domicile nor the principal place of business of the defendant airline; nor is it the place of destination. As regards the third option of the plaintiff, the petitioner contends that since the Philippines is not the place where the contract of carriage was made between the parties herein, Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over this action for damages.

ISSUE

Whether or not RTC of Cebu has jurisdiction over the case against American Airlines given Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.

RULING

Yes, RTC of Cebu has jurisdiction over the case in view of Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.

Under Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw convention an action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff either before the court of the 1) domicile of the carrier; 2) the carrier’s principal place of business; 3) the place where the carrier has a place of business through which the contract was made; 4) the place of destination.

In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner issued the ticket in Geneva which was neither the domicile nor the principal place of business of the petitioner nor the respondent’s place of destination. However, SC held that the contract of carriage between the private respondent and Singapore Airlines although performed by different carriers under a series of airline tickets constitutes a single operation. The third option under Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention e.g., to sue in the place of business of the carrier wherein the contract was made, is therefore, Manila, and Philippine courts are clothed with jurisdiction over this case. While this case was filed in Cebu and not in Manila the issue of venue is no longer an issue as the petitioner is deemed to have waived it when it presented evidence before the trial court.

Case Digest: Merit Freight International Inc. vs. Federal Express Pacific Inc., C.A. G.R. SP. No. 119658

Merit Freight International Inc. vs. Federal Express Pacific Inc., C.A. G.R. SP. No. 119658, January 23, 2013

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

On 18 March 2009, respondent [Federal Express Pacific, Inc.] filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”) an Application for Authority to Operate as an International Airfreight Forwarder.

On 14 March 2011, after all parties to the case were heard and evidence received, the CAB issued the respondent a provisional authority to operate as an International Airfreight Forwarder. The license was valid for one (1) year effective 10 March 2011 until 9 March 2012.

On 12 April 2011, respondent filed a Motion to Issue Regular License, valid for a period of at least five (5) years.

On 25 April 2011, petitioner [Merit Freight International, Inc.] filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition/Comment to Applicant's Motion for Issuance of Regular License. 

On 2 May 2011, the CAB granted the motion and issued respondent a regular license, allowing it to operate as an international airfreight forwarder for a period of five years, i.e., from 2 May 2011 until 1 May 2016.

Petitioners felt aggrieved by the above resolution of the Civil Aeronautics Board; thus, they filed the present petitions.

ISSUE

Whether or not only Filipinos can be granted a permit to engage in international airfreight forwarding business.

RULING

Yes, only Filipinos can be granted a permit to engage in international airfreight forwarding business.

The 1987 Constitution “provides for the Filipinization of public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should be granted only to ‘citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.’

In this case, Federal Express Pacific, Inc., a “foreign corporation”, disqualified in our country from operating as an “International Airfreight Forwarder” which is clearly a public utility. Old Civil Aeronautics Board’s policy of limiting the issuance of permits to Filipino citizens with regard to the business of international airfreight forwarding, and (2) appellate court’s ruling that international airfreight forwarding, as a public utility enterprise, is covered by the restriction provided under Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. 

Case Digest: Go Chan vs. Aboitiz, 98 Phil 179

 

Go Chan vs. Aboitiz, 98 Phil 179

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

The plaintiff shipped 240 cases of milk and the corresponding freight was paid; that the cargo was transhipped on the S. S. Snug Hitch and arrived at the port of Cebu in 1947 with 24 cases shortlanded; that a timely claim for the short-landed cargo of 24 cases was presented by the plaintiff to the defendant but the latter asked to defer the claim; that when the 24 cases arrived, Go Tiong, the General Manager of the plaintiff corporation did not receive them because they were no longer in cases but in sakes, and that the cans were no longer fit for human consumption - they were damaged and rusty; that the delay in payment was due to the request of the defendant for amicable settlement which later, the defendant refused to pay.

The defendant answered that the loss was due to a peril of the sea and that anyway the action was barred because more than one year had elapsed from February 1947 to May 1950 when the complaint was filed.

The court of first instance of Cebu rendered judgment for the plaintiff. Having failed in a motion to reconsider, defendant perfected its appeal.

ISSUE

Whether or not the action has already prescribed.

RULING

Yes, the action has prescribed.

Under existing jurisprudence, the prescriptive period of one year established in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act modified pro tanto the provisions of Act No. 190 as to goods transported to and from Philippine ports in foreign trade.

In this case, the transaction under consideration is covered by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and since this is a special act, its provisions must of necessity limit or restrict a law of general application. Moreover, since the action was not filed within one year from February, 1947 when the cargo was delivered or should have been delivered, the law discharged this defendant from all liability in connection with the carriage of said goods.

Case Digest: Chiok Ho vs. Compañia Maritima, 13 SCRA 734, 737

Chiok Ho vs. Compañia Maritima, 13 SCRA 734, 737, April 30, 1965

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

A shipment of 69 cases containing radio parts was discharged from the vessel S.S. Samar of the Compañia Maritima and placed in the Special Cargo Coral of the Manila Port Service which was then operating the arrastre service at the Port of Manila. Marinduque Iron Mines, Inc. is the consignee. However, upon delivery of said goods, the consignee found that 4 cases were missing.

Chiok Ho, the assignee, made a formal demand upon the Manila Port Service for the payment of the value of missing goods which was refused by CM. For this reason, Chiok Ho filed the action before the CFI of Manila to recover not the amount of missing goods plus attorney’s fees, and expenses of litigation.

CFI rendered a decision ordering the defendants, Manila Port Service and the Manila Railroad Company, to pay the plaintiff. Hence, the defendants interposed the present appeal.

The defendant alleged that since the appellee did not file his claim with the Manila Port Service within the reglementary 15-day period, stamped as notice on both delivery permit and pertinent gates passes used to withdraw the goods, from May 15, 1960 the date of discharge of the last package of the shipment from the carrying vessel, his claim is already barred and, consequently, his action should be dismissed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the reglementary 15-day period has expired.

RULING

No, the reglementary 15-day period has not expired.

Under the law, when the claim for indemnity for a particular loss is rejected, such claim shall be filed "within 15 days from the date of discharge of the last package from the carrying vessel."

In this case, the stipulation is completely silent as to when the shipment was delivered to the consignee. It is not enough that the consignee be notified of the discharge of the shipment from the carrying vessel in order that section 15 of the management agreement may be applicable. It is equally important to indicate the date when the shipment was actually delivered to the consignee in order that he may be given the chance to discover if there is something missing or lost in the shipment. Only in this way can he be apprised of the loss and file the necessary claim, - not otherwise. Since this is a matter of defense on the part of the defendants, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it should be presumed that the claim was filed within the reglementary period, as properly found by the lower court.