Case Digest: Sulpicio Lines vs. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 478 G.R. No. 93291

 

Sulpicio Lines vs. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 478 G.R. No. 93291, March 29, 1999

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

The two (2) fishing boats, F/B Aquarius ‘C’ and F/B Aquarius ‘G’, had a speed of about 7.5 to 8 knots per hour while M/V Don Sulpicio was running about 15.5 knots per hour. The weather at that time the accident happened was clear and visibility was good. In other words, the men of Don Sulpicio could see the 2 fishing boats which were ahead about 4 miles and likewise, the men of the 2 fishing boats could see M/V Don Sulpicio following.

The plaintiff claims that they are on the same speed when they were rammed by M/V Don Sulpicio. Hence a complaint for damages of Aquarius Fishing Co., Inc. against Sulpicio Lines, Inc. and Cresencio G. Castaneda was filed before RTC in Bacolod City.

After the trial, RTC decided in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration by the appellants was also denied. Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioners asserted that private respondent, through its patron, admitted that the vessel had no lookout during the collision despite the absolute rule provided in Rule 9 of the Rules of Road. To bolster its stance, it contended that it was a privileged vessel pursuant to Rules 19, 21, 22, 23 of the Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea.

ISSUE

Whether or not the collision between M/V Don Sulpicio and F/B Aquarius ‘G’ was due to the negligence of the defendant (petitioner).

RULING

Yes, the collision was due to the negligence of the defendant (petitioner).

Art 827 states that if the collision is imputable to both vessels, each one shall suffer her own damage, and both shall be solidarily liable for the damages occasioned to their cargoes. Art 828 further states that provisions of the preceding article are applicable to case in which it cannot be determined which od the two vessels has caused the collision.

In this case, SC hold firm with the findings of the court a quo. Whether or not the collision sued upon occurred in a crossing situation is immaterial, CA relied on Rule 24-C of the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at the Sea and ruled that the duty to keep out of the way remained even if the overtaking vessel cannot determine with certainty whether she is forward of or abaft more than 2 points from the vessel. M/V "Don Sulpicio" must assume responsibility as it was in a better position to avoid the collision. It should have blown its horn or given signs to warn the other vessel that it was to overtake it. Assuming argumenti ex gratia that F/B Aquarius "G" had no lookout during the collision, the omission does not suffice to exculpate Sulpicio Lines from liability.

Case Digest: Smith Bell vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 201, G.R. No. 56294

 

Smith Bell vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 201, G.R. No. 56294, May 20, 1991

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

M/V “Don Carlos,” an inter-island vessel owned and operated by private respondent Go Thong was sailing southbound for Cebu, when it collided with M/S “Yotai Maru,” a merchant vessel of Japanese registry which was approaching the port of Manila coming in from Kobe, Japan. The bow of the “Don Carlos” rammed the left side of the “Yotai Maru” inflicting a gaping hole through which seawater rushed in and flooded the hatch, damaging all the cargo stowed therein.

The consignees of the damaged cargo having been paid by their insurance companies, the latter in turn commenced actions against private respondent Go Thong for damages sustained by the various shipments.

Two cases were filed before the RTC. The first case, Smith Bell and Sumitomo Insurance v. Go Thong, reached the SC which ruled in finality that negligence was with the officers and crew of “Don Carlos.” On the contrary, the second case, Smith Bell and Tokyo Insurance v. Go Thong, was decided by the CA holding the officers and crew of “Yotai Maru” at fault in the collision.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not Don Carlos" had been negligent, or so negligent as to have proximately caused the collision between them.

RULING

Yes, Don Carlos" had been negligent, or so negligent as to have proximately caused the collision between them.

In this case, there are three (3) principal factors that are constitutive of negligence on the part of the “Don Carlos,” which negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.

(1) The first of these factors was the failure of the “Don Carlos” to comply with the requirements of Rule 18 (a) of the International Rules of the Road which provides as follows: (a) When two power-driven vessels are meeting end on, or nearly end on, so as to involve risk of collision, each shall alter her course to starboard, so that each may pass on the port side of the other. The evidence on this factor state that “Don Carlos” altered its course by five degrees to the left instead of to the right which maneuver was the error that caused the collision in question. Why it did so is because “Don Carlos” was overtaking another vessel, the “Don Francisco”, and was then at the right side of the aforesaid vessel. It was in the process of overtaking “Don Francisco” that “Don Carlos” was finally brought into a situation where he was meeting end-on or nearly end-on “Yotai Maru, thus involving risk of collision.

(2) The second circumstance constitutive of negligence on the part of the “Don Carlos” was its failure to have on board that night a “proper look-out” as required by Rule I (B) Under Rule 29 of the same set of Rules, all consequences arising from the failure of the “Don Carlos” to keep a “proper look-out” must be borne by the “Don Carlos.” In the case at bar, the failure of the “Don Carlos” to recognize in a timely manner the risk of collision with the “Yotai Maru” coming in from the opposite direction, was at least in part due to the failure of the “Don Carlos” to maintain a proper look-out.

(3) The third factor constitutive of negligence on the part of the “Don Carlos” relates to the fact that Second Mate Benito German was, immediately before and during the collision, in command of the “Don Carlos.” Second Mate German simply did not have the level of experience, judgment and skill essential for recognizing and coping with the risk of collision as it presented itself that early morning when the “Don Carlos,” running at maximum speed and having just overtaken the “Don Francisco” then approximately one mile behind to the right side of the “Don Carlos,” found itself head-on or nearly head on vis-a-vis the “Yotai Maru. ” It is essential to point out that this situation was created by the “Don Carlos” itself. Under the law, a "proper look-out" is one who has been trained as such and who is given no other duty save to act as a look-out and who is stationed where he can see and hear best and maintain good communication with the officer in charge of the vessel, and who must, of course, be vigilant.

Case Digest: Philippine Home Assurance vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 468, G.R. No. 196999

 

Philippine Home Assurance vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 468, G.R. No. 196999, June 20, 1996

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (ESLI) loaded on board SS Eastern Explorer in Kobe, Japan, a shipment for carriage to Manila and Cebu, freight pre-paid and in good order and condition. While the vessel was off Okinawa, Japan, a small flame was detected on the acetylene cylinder. As the crew was trying to extinguish the fire, the acetylene cylinder exploded causing death and severe injuries to the crew and instantly setting fire to the whole superstructure of the vessel. The incident forced the master and the crew to abandon the ship.

Several hours later, a tugboat pulled the ship to port, and firefighting operations were again conducted. After the fire was extinguished, the cargoes were saved and loaded to another vessel for delivery to their original ports of destination. ESLI charged the consignees several amounts corresponding to additional freight and salvage charges.

The charges were all paid by Philippine Home Assurance Corporation (PHAC) under protest for and in behalf of the consignees.

PHAC, as subrogee of the consignees, filed a complaint before the RTC of Manila against ESLI to recover the sum paid under protest on the ground that the same were damages directly brought about by the fault, negligence, illegal act and/or breach of contract of ESLI.

ESLI contended that it exercised the diligence required by law in the handling, custody and carriage of the shipment; that the fire was caused by an unforeseen event; that the additional freight charges are due and demandable under the Bill of Lading; and that salvage charges are properly collectible under Act No. 2616, known as the Salvage Law.

The trial court dismissed PHAC's complaint and ruled in favor of ESLI. On appeal, the CA affirmed RTC's findings and conclusions. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE

Whether or not the expenses or averages incurred in saving the cargo constitute a general average.

RULING

No, the expenses incurred in saving the cargo do not constitute a general average.

Under the law, general or gross averages include all damages and expenses that are deliberately caused in order to save the vessel, its cargo, or both at the same time, from a real and known risk.

In this case, strong evidence indicates that the acetylene cylinder caught fire because of the fault and negligence of respondent ESLI, its captain, and its crew. While the instant case may technically fall within the purview of the said provision, the formalities prescribed under Articles 813 and 814 of the Code of Commerce to incur expenses and cause damage corresponding to the gross average were not complied with. The cargo consignees cannot be made liable to the respondent carrier for additional freight and salvage charges. Therefore, the respondent carrier must refund the petitioner the amount it paid under protest for additional freight and salvage charges on behalf of the consignees.

Case Digest: International Harvest vs. Hamburg American, 42 Phil 845, G.R. No. 11515

 

International Harvest vs. Hamburg American, 42 Phil 845, G.R. No. 11515, July 29, 1918

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

In 1914, the International Harvester Company in Russia (plaintiff) delivered a consignment of agricultural machinery consisting of 852 boxes, crates, and parcels to the Hamburg-American Line (defendant) in Baltimore for transportation to Vladivostock, Russia. The bill of lading stipulated that the goods would be forwarded from Hamburg to Vladivostock at the ship's expense but at the owner's risk. Due to the outbreak of war in Europe, the cargo was transferred to the Suevia, a German vessel, which sought refuge in Manila. The plaintiff demanded the cargo's forwarding to Vladivostock, but the defendant insisted on subjecting the cargo to liability for general average expenses incurred during the Suevia's stay in Manila. The plaintiff refused, demanding immediate delivery. The defendant offered delivery on the condition of a 20% deposit for general average costs.

IHCR then instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, seeking to recover the possession of the cargo and damages for breach of contract and unlawful detention. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, recognizing its right to possession and awarding damages for the expenses incurred in forwarding the goods to Vladivostock. The defendant appealed this judgment.

ISSUE

Whether or not the cargo belonging to IHCR is liable to be made to contribute, by way of general average, to the costs and expenses incurred by reason of the internment of the Suevia in the port of Manila

RULING

No, the cargo in question is not liable to a general average.

Under the law, when a ship shall have entered a port of refuge in consequence of accident, sacrifice, or other extraordinary circumstance which renders that necessary for the common safety, the expense of entering such port shall be admitted as general average.

In this case, it is not claimed that this agricultural machinery was contraband of war; and being neutral goods, it was not liable to forfeiture in the event of capture by the enemies of the ship's flag. It follows that when the master of the Suevia decided to take refuge in the port of Manila, he acted exclusively with a view to the protection of his vessel. There was no common danger to the ship and cargo; and therefore, it was not a case for a general average. Moreover, HAL is liable for the expenses incurred by IHCR in contracting a different shipper. By the terms of the contract of affreightment HAL was bound to forward the cargo to Vladivostock at the steamer’s expense, not necessarily by a steamer belonging to HAL.

Case Digest: Magsaysay vs. Agan, 96 Phil. 504, G.R. No. L6393

 

Magsaysay vs. Agan, 96 Phil. 504, G.R. No. L6393, January 31, 1955

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

The S S "San Antonio", vessel owned and operated by plaintiff bound for Basco, Batanes, vis Aparri, Cagayan, with general cargo belonging to different shippers, among them the defendant. It made a day's stopover and while in Aparri port, it ran aground at the mouth of the Cagayan river. In attempt to refloat it, plaintiff employed the Luzon Stevedoring Co. at an agreed compensation.

The plaintiff brought the present action in the CFI of Manila to make defendant pay his contribution on the expenses incurred in refloating the vessel which constitutes the general average and shared by the cargo owners.

Defendant, in his answer, denies liability to his amount, alleging, among other things, that the stranding of the vessel was due to the fault, negligence and lack of skill of its master.

After trial, the lower court found for plaintiff and rendered judgment against the defendant for the amount of the claim, with legal interests. Hence, this petition by the defendant.

ISSUE

Whether or not the expenses incurred in floating a vessel so stranded should be considered general average and shared by the cargo owners.

RULING

No, the expenses cannot be considered general average and shared by the cargo owners.

Under the law, the following are requisites for the general average: (1) there must be a common danger; (2) that for the common safety part of the vessel or of the cargo or both is sacrificed deliberately; (3) that from the expenses or damages caused follows the successful saving of the vessel and cargo; and (4) that the expenses or damages should have been incurred or inflicted after taking proper legal steps and authority.

In this case, concerning the requisites for the general average: (1) the evidence does not disclose that the expenses sought to be recovered from the defendant were incurred to save the vessel and cargo from a common danger; (2) the expenses in question were not incurred for the common safety of vessel and cargo, since they, or at least the cargo, were not in imminent peril; (3) the sacrifice was for the benefit of the vessel to enable it to proceed to destination and not to save the cargo, thus, the cargo owners are not in law bound to contribute to the expenses; and lastly, (4) it does not appear that the expenses here in question were incurred after following the procedure laid down in article 813 of the Code of Commerce. Absent all requisites, this case is not made out for the general average. Therefore, the expenses cannot be shared by the cargo owners. 

Case Digest: Yu Con vs. Ipil, 41 Phil 770, G.R.No. 10195

 

Yu Con vs. Ipil, 41 Phil 770, G.R. No. 10195, December 29, 1916

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Yu Con, a merchant from San Nicolas, Cebu, had chartered a banca named Maria from Narciso Lauron for the transportation of merchandise and money. On 17 October 1911, Yu Con delivered P450 to Ipil and Solamo, master and supercargo of the banca, for delivery to Ipil and Solamo's shop in Catmon. However, the money disappeared on 18 October, and no investigation was conducted.

Yu Con sued to recover the lost sum, claiming it was due to the defendants' negligence or abandonment of their duty. The court concluded that Lauron was responsible for the negligence, and Yu Con was entitled to recover the lost amount. Judgment was rendered on 20 April 1914, favoring Yu Con and Ipil, et. al., for P450, with interest at 6% per annum from the complaint's filing.

ISSUE

Whether or not the banca may be considered as a vessel and whether or not Glicerio Ipil, as a master, may be considered as the captain in the determination of liability.

RULING

YES. The text discusses the legal relationship between Yu Con and defendant Narciso Lauron, who owned a banca called Maria. The term "vessel" refers to any kind of craft, regardless of its technical name or future nautical advancements. In maritime commerce, "captain" and "master" have the same meaning, both being chiefs or commanders of ships. In the Philippines, the Code of Commerce compares masters with captains, with masters governing vessels that navigate high seas or ships of large dimensions and importance, and masters commanding smaller ships engaged exclusively in coastwise trade. The agent is civilly liable for indemnities in favor of third persons arising from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods the vessel carried. In this case, defendant Narciso Lauron should be held civilly liable to the plaintiff for the loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 belonging to the plaintiff and delivered to the master and supercargo.

 

Case Digest: Wallem Maritime vs. NLRC, 263 SCRA 174, G.R. No. 108433

 

Wallem Maritime vs. NLRC, 263 SCRA 174, G.R. No. 108433, October 15, 1996

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Macatuno and Gurimbao (respondents) were dismissed from work due to an incident wherein they allegedly caused harm to an apprentice. The captain summoned private respondent and Gurimbao. With the head of the deck crew (bosun), they went to the captain's cabin. The captain told them to pack up their things as their services were being terminated. They would disembark at the next port, the Port of Ube, from where they would be flown home to the Philippines, the repatriation expenses to be shouldered by them.

The two attempted to explain their side of the incident but the captain ignored them and firmly told them to go home. Before disembarking, they were entrusted by the bosun with a letter of their fellow crew members, addressed to Captain Diño, attesting to their innocence.

At the Port of Ube, an agent of the company handed them their plane tickets and accompanied them the following day to the Fukuoka Airport where they boarded a Cathay Pacific airplane bound for Manila. The evidence presented to support this claim was a copy of the official logbook. It stated that the respondents were acting violently. The logbook was objected to due to being hearsay evidence and was affirmed.

ISSUE

Whether or not captain of the M/T Fortuna may discharge private respondent and Gurimbao without just cause.

RULING

No.

Under the law, Art 637 of Title VII Commercial Contracts for Transportation Overland states that “ Neither can the captain discharge a sailor during the time of his contract except for just cause: (1) the perpetration of a crime, which disturbs order on the vessel; (2) Repeated offenses of insubordination, of want of discipline, or of non- fulfilment of the service; (3) Incapacity and repeated negligence in the fulfillment of the service he should render; (4) habitual drunkenness; (5) any occurrence, which incapacitates the sailor to perform the work under his charge, with the exception of the provisions contained in Art 644; and (6) desertion.

In this case, no investigation report was presented to prove that complainant was given the opportunity to air his side of the incident. Further, copy of the alleged official logbook was not properly authenticated. The authentication is necessary specially so since this document is the only piece of evidence submitted by respondents.