Case Digest: Meralco vs. Marco Textiles, 374 SCRA 69, G.R. No. 126243

 

Meralco vs. Marco Textiles, 374 SCRA 69, G.R. No. 126243, January 18, 2002

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Pursuant to the contract between MERALCO and MACRO, petitioner installed at respondent’s premises metering devices and necessary appurtenances thereto to record the latter’s electric energy consumption. The metering devices were duly identified by their meter and serial numbers: DB 351-86-02-315 and DB 351-85-04-362 while the installation of electric service was under billing account No. 9400-1822-19. Prior to installation, the BOE pre-tested, pre-calibrated and sealed the metering devices. Upon their installation at respondent’s premises, the devices were properly sealed and ascertained to be in perfect operating condition.

When respondent’s weaving department was gutted by fire on February 27, 1982, it caused a slump in the business resulting in irregular electric reading. It started operations in 1983 but was confined to dyeing textiles. Private respondent’s electric consumption varied, 30,000 to 66,000 kilowatt-hours (kwh) in 1984, 9,000 to 33,000 kwh in 1985 and 9,000 to 12,000 kwh in 1986.

MERALCO made several inspections. Each inspection resulted in a different billing.

The inspection report revealed that the meter tampering was committed once again. The meter seals were missing, and the polarity and non-polarity jaw of upper & lower elements were forcibly opened and hence, the meter disc stopped for all tests with loads on.

 MACRO filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for injunction with an application for a restraining order against MERALCO to restrain MERALCO from cutting MACRO’S electric service and to compel MERALCO to explain its billing.

The RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the parties to maintain the status quo. After trial RTC rendered decision in favor of MACRO ordering MERALCO to restrain from disconnecting the power installation of MACRO, likewise, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not MACRO tampered with the electric consumption meters.

RULING

No, MACRO did not tamper with the electric consumption meter

Under the law, the private electric utility or rural electric cooperative have the right and authority to disconnect the electric service after serving notice or warning to that effect without the need of a court or administrative order if someone caught in flagrante delicto doing of any acts tampers, jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen

In this case, Macro did not commit tampering act, as MACRO religiously paid its Monthly billing. Here, MERALCO committed wrongful and injurious invasion of MACRO''s rights by insinuating tampering of meters and demanding bills which are arbitrary, unjust, baseless and unexplained. "MERALCO should bear the loss. Public service companies which do not exercise prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to bear the consequences of such oversight.

Case Digest: Republic vs. Express Telecom, 373 SCRA 316, G.R. No. 147096

 

Republic vs. Express Telecom, 373 SCRA 316, G.R. No. 147096, January 15, 2002

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

In 1992, Bayantel filed an application with the NTC for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to operate a CMTS.

On May 17, 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators, as provided for under Memorandum Circular No. 3-3-99.

On February 1, 2000, the NTC granted BayanTel's motion to revive the latter's application and set the case for hearings. Extelcom filed in NTC an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's application and alleged that there was no public need for the service applied for by Bayantel.

On May 3, 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service. With this, Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the annulment of the NTC’s order.

On September 13, 2000, the Court of Appeals granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by Extelcom. The orders of NTC were annulled and set aside and the Amended Application of respondent Bayantel is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application.

Bayantel filed a motion for reconsideration. NTC, represented by OSG, also filed its own motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, Extelcom filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum Circular No. 9-3-2000 be also declared null and void.  CA denied all of the motions for reconsideration of the parties for lack of merit. Hence, the NTC and Bayantel filed separate petitions for review.

ISSUE

Whether or not CA seriously erred in declaring the May 3, 2000 order granting Bayantel a provisional authority should be set aside and reversed.

RULING

Yes, CA seriously erred in declaring the May 3, 2000 order granting Bayantel a provisional authority should be set aside and reversed.

Section 16 of the Public Service Act authorizes the then PSC, upon notice and hearing, to issue Certificates of Public Convenience for the operation of public services within the Philippines "whenever the Commission finds that the operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner."

Section 29 of the Public Service Act states that all hearings and investigations before the Commission shall be governed by rules adopted by the Commission, and in the conduct thereof, the Commission shall not be bound by the technical rules of legal evidence.

In this case, the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the Order of the NTC dated May 3, 2000, granting Bayantel a provisional authority to install, operate and maintain CMTS. The general rule is that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. The established exception to the rule is where the issuing authority has gone beyond its statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion. None of these obtains in the case at bar.

Case Digest: Telecom vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 132922

 

Telecom vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. and GMA Network, Inc. challenge the validity of Section 92 of BP 881 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

Petitioner GMA Network claims that it suffered losses in providing COMELEC Time in the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners contend that Section 92 of BP 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation claiming that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers. Petitioners claim that Section 92 is an invalid amendment of R.A. No. 7252 which granted GMA Network, Inc. a franchise for the operation of radio and television broadcasting stations. They argue that although Section 5 of R.A. No. 7252 gives the government the power to temporarily use and operate the stations of petitioner GMA Network or to authorize such use and operation, the exercise of this right must be compensated. Petitioners also complain that B.P. 881, Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free airtime.

Finally, it is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Section 92 of the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit.

ISSUE

Whether or not the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Section 92 of the Constitution includes the power to prohibit.

RULING

Yes, the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Section 92 of the Constitution includes the power to prohibit.

The Constitution allows the COMELEC to regulate the use of media information, while Congress prohibits the sale or donation of print space or airtime for political ads. This distinction between the object of supervision and regulation is a fallacy. Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 only half of the regulatory provision, mandated by the COMELEC to procure print space and airtime for allocation to candidates. The law ensures free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections by allocating equal time and space for all candidates.

The prohibition on media advertising by candidates limits the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space, which are the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. Failure to provide airtime unless paid by the government would deprive the people of their right to know. The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern and states that the use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to promote distributive justice and intervene when the common good demands it.

To affirm the validity of Section 92 of B.P. 881, public broadcasters must ensure the variety and vigor of public debate on election issues. Broadcast media are not just common carriers but also public trustees responsible for ensuring access to the diversity of views on political issues. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their reward in providing altruistic service in connection with election holdings.

Case Digest: Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. L-5458

 

Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. L-5458, September 16, 1953

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Petitioners are engaged in the stevedoring or lighterage and harbor towage business. They are also engaged in interisland service which consist of hauling cargoes such as sugar, oil, fertilizer and other commercial commodities. There is no fixed route in the transportation of these cargoes, the same being left at the indication of the owner or shipper of the goods. Petitioners, in their hauling business, serve only a limited portion of the public.

The Philippine Shipowners’ Association complained to the Public Service Commission that petitioners were engaged in the transportation of cargo in the Philippines for hire or compensation without authority or approval of the Commission. The rates petitioners charged resulted in ruinous competition.

The Public Service Commission restrained petitioners from further operating their watercraft to transport goods for hire or compensation between points in the Philippines until the commission approves the rates they propose to charge.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioners fall under the definition in Section 13 (b) of the Public Service Law (C.A. Act No. 146).

RULING

Yes. It is not necessary under said definition that one holds himself out as serving or willing to serve the public in order to be considered public service. It is not necessary, in order to be a public service, that an organization be dedicated to public use, i.e., ready and willing to serve the public as a class. It is only necessary that it must in some way be impressed with a public interest; and whether the operation of a business is a public utility depends upon whether or not the service rendered by it is of a public character and of public consequence and concern.

It can scarcely be denied that the contracts between the owners of the barges and the owners of the cargo at bar were ordinary contracts of transportation and not of lease. Petitioners’ watercraft was manned entirely by crews in their employ and payroll, and the operation of the said craft was under their direction and control, the customers assuming no responsibility for the goods handled on the barges.

C.A. No. 146 clearly declares that an enterprise of any of the kinds therein enumerated is a public service if conducted for hire or compensation even if the operator deals only with a portion of the public or limited clientele. Public utility, even where the term is not defined by statute, is not determined by the number of people actually served.

The Public Service Law was enacted not only to protect the public against unreasonable charges and poor, inefficient service, but also to prevent ruinous competition.

Just as the legislature may not declare a company or enterprise to be a public utility when it is not inherently such, a public utility may not evade control and supervision of its operation by the government by selecting its customers under the guise of private transactions.

Case Digest: Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. No. 119528

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. No. 119528, March 26, 1997

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Private respondent Grand Air applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). This application was opposed by petitioner PAL which is a holder of a legislative franchise to operate air transport services alleging that that the CAB had no jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s application until Grand Air has first obtained a franchise to operate from Congress.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CAB had the jurisdiction to hear the application because Grand Air did not possess a legislative franchise.

Whether or not the Congress, in enacting Republic Act 776, has delegated the authority to authorize the operation of domestic air transport services to the respondent Board, such that Congressional mandate for the approval of such authority is no longer necessary.

RULING

Yes, the CAB had the jurisdiction to hear the application because Grand Air did not possess a legislative franchise.

The Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, or Temporary Operating Permit to a domestic air transport operator, who, though not possessing a legislative franchise, meets all the other requirements prescribed by the law.

There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator. Although Section 11 of Article XII recognizes Congress’ control over any franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it does not mean Congress has exclusive authority to issue the same. Franchises issued by Congress are not required before each and every public utility may operate. In many instances, Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to government agencies, specialized particularly in their respective areas of public service.

Congress gave CAB the power to issue permits for the operation of domestic transport services. It has delegated to the said body the authority to determine the capability and competence of a prospective domestic air transport operator to engage in such venture.

Case Digest: LTO vs. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805, G.R. No. 131512

 

LTO vs. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805, G.R. No. 131512, January 20, 2000

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

The Sangguniang Panglungsod (SP) of Butuan on August 16, 1992 passed an ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Tricycles for hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other purposes.”

The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees, fees for registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof. The City of Butuan asserts that Sec. 129 and Sec.133 of the Local Government Code is their basis for said ordinance and that, said provisions authorize LGUs to collect registration fees or charges along with, in its view, the corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles.

LTO explains that one of the functions of the National Government, that, indeed has been transferred to LGUs is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the LTFRB but NOT the authority of the LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.

The RTC of Butuan decreed an issuance of a PERMANENT WRIT OF INJUCTION against LTO prohibiting and enjoining LTO, as well as its employees and other persons acting in its behalf, from (a) registering tricycles and (b) issuing licenses to tricycle drivers. The CA sustained the trial court’s decision. The adverse rulings of both Courts prompted the LTO to file an instant petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the earlier Court decisions.

ISSUE

Whether or not under the present set-up the power of the LTO to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof has likewise devolved to Local Government Units.

RULING

No, under the present set-up the power of the LTO to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof has not likewise devolved to Local Government Units.

Under the Local Government Code (specifically Sec. 458 (8)(3)(VI)), the Local Government Units now have the power to REGULATE (to fix, establish or control, to adjust by rule, method or establish mode to direct by rule or restriction; or to subject to governing principles or laws) the operation of tricycles for hire and grant franchises thereof but they are still subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC (Department of Transportation and Communications; under Article 458(a) [3-VI] of the RA 7160).

In this case, said powers [to register and issue licenses] remain under LTO’s exclusive jurisdiction. The registration and licensing functions are vested in the LTO (pursuant to Art. 3 Sec. 4(d) [1], 10 of RA 4136-Land Transportation and Traffic Code) while franchising and regulatory responsibilities are vested in the LTFRB (Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board; pursuant to EO # 202).

Case Digest: Pangasinan Transportation, Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission, 70 Phil 221, G.R. No. 47065

 

Pangasinan Transportation, Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission, 70 Phil 221, G.R. No. 47065, June 26, 1940

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

PANTRANCO, a holder of an existing Certificate of Public Convenience is applying to operate additional buses with the Public Service Commission (PSC) has been engaged in transporting passengers in certain provinces by means of public transportation utility. Patranc applied for authorization to operate 10 additional trucks. The PSC granted the application but added several conditions for PANTRANCO’s compliance. One is that the service can be acquired by government upon payment of the cost price less depreciation, and that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time.

ISSUE

Whether or not PSC can impose said conditions, if so, wouldn’t this power of the PSC constitute an undue delegation of powers.

 RULING

Yes, there was valid delegation of powers.

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action at the same time forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. But due to the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation.”

All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

The welfare and interest of the public are the paramount considerations in determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular business. The State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police power, which is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. Therefore, requiring the government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.