Case Digest: Telecom vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 132922

 

Telecom vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. and GMA Network, Inc. challenge the validity of Section 92 of BP 881 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

Petitioner GMA Network claims that it suffered losses in providing COMELEC Time in the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners contend that Section 92 of BP 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation claiming that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers. Petitioners claim that Section 92 is an invalid amendment of R.A. No. 7252 which granted GMA Network, Inc. a franchise for the operation of radio and television broadcasting stations. They argue that although Section 5 of R.A. No. 7252 gives the government the power to temporarily use and operate the stations of petitioner GMA Network or to authorize such use and operation, the exercise of this right must be compensated. Petitioners also complain that B.P. 881, Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free airtime.

Finally, it is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Section 92 of the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit.

ISSUE

Whether or not the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Section 92 of the Constitution includes the power to prohibit.

RULING

Yes, the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Section 92 of the Constitution includes the power to prohibit.

The Constitution allows the COMELEC to regulate the use of media information, while Congress prohibits the sale or donation of print space or airtime for political ads. This distinction between the object of supervision and regulation is a fallacy. Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 only half of the regulatory provision, mandated by the COMELEC to procure print space and airtime for allocation to candidates. The law ensures free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections by allocating equal time and space for all candidates.

The prohibition on media advertising by candidates limits the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space, which are the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. Failure to provide airtime unless paid by the government would deprive the people of their right to know. The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern and states that the use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to promote distributive justice and intervene when the common good demands it.

To affirm the validity of Section 92 of B.P. 881, public broadcasters must ensure the variety and vigor of public debate on election issues. Broadcast media are not just common carriers but also public trustees responsible for ensuring access to the diversity of views on political issues. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their reward in providing altruistic service in connection with election holdings.

Case Digest: Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. L-5458

 

Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. L-5458, September 16, 1953

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Petitioners are engaged in the stevedoring or lighterage and harbor towage business. They are also engaged in interisland service which consist of hauling cargoes such as sugar, oil, fertilizer and other commercial commodities. There is no fixed route in the transportation of these cargoes, the same being left at the indication of the owner or shipper of the goods. Petitioners, in their hauling business, serve only a limited portion of the public.

The Philippine Shipowners’ Association complained to the Public Service Commission that petitioners were engaged in the transportation of cargo in the Philippines for hire or compensation without authority or approval of the Commission. The rates petitioners charged resulted in ruinous competition.

The Public Service Commission restrained petitioners from further operating their watercraft to transport goods for hire or compensation between points in the Philippines until the commission approves the rates they propose to charge.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioners fall under the definition in Section 13 (b) of the Public Service Law (C.A. Act No. 146).

RULING

Yes. It is not necessary under said definition that one holds himself out as serving or willing to serve the public in order to be considered public service. It is not necessary, in order to be a public service, that an organization be dedicated to public use, i.e., ready and willing to serve the public as a class. It is only necessary that it must in some way be impressed with a public interest; and whether the operation of a business is a public utility depends upon whether or not the service rendered by it is of a public character and of public consequence and concern.

It can scarcely be denied that the contracts between the owners of the barges and the owners of the cargo at bar were ordinary contracts of transportation and not of lease. Petitioners’ watercraft was manned entirely by crews in their employ and payroll, and the operation of the said craft was under their direction and control, the customers assuming no responsibility for the goods handled on the barges.

C.A. No. 146 clearly declares that an enterprise of any of the kinds therein enumerated is a public service if conducted for hire or compensation even if the operator deals only with a portion of the public or limited clientele. Public utility, even where the term is not defined by statute, is not determined by the number of people actually served.

The Public Service Law was enacted not only to protect the public against unreasonable charges and poor, inefficient service, but also to prevent ruinous competition.

Just as the legislature may not declare a company or enterprise to be a public utility when it is not inherently such, a public utility may not evade control and supervision of its operation by the government by selecting its customers under the guise of private transactions.

Case Digest: Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. No. 119528

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. No. 119528, March 26, 1997

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Private respondent Grand Air applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). This application was opposed by petitioner PAL which is a holder of a legislative franchise to operate air transport services alleging that that the CAB had no jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s application until Grand Air has first obtained a franchise to operate from Congress.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CAB had the jurisdiction to hear the application because Grand Air did not possess a legislative franchise.

Whether or not the Congress, in enacting Republic Act 776, has delegated the authority to authorize the operation of domestic air transport services to the respondent Board, such that Congressional mandate for the approval of such authority is no longer necessary.

RULING

Yes, the CAB had the jurisdiction to hear the application because Grand Air did not possess a legislative franchise.

The Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, or Temporary Operating Permit to a domestic air transport operator, who, though not possessing a legislative franchise, meets all the other requirements prescribed by the law.

There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator. Although Section 11 of Article XII recognizes Congress’ control over any franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it does not mean Congress has exclusive authority to issue the same. Franchises issued by Congress are not required before each and every public utility may operate. In many instances, Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to government agencies, specialized particularly in their respective areas of public service.

Congress gave CAB the power to issue permits for the operation of domestic transport services. It has delegated to the said body the authority to determine the capability and competence of a prospective domestic air transport operator to engage in such venture.

Case Digest: LTO vs. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805, G.R. No. 131512

 

LTO vs. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805, G.R. No. 131512, January 20, 2000

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

The Sangguniang Panglungsod (SP) of Butuan on August 16, 1992 passed an ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Tricycles for hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other purposes.”

The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees, fees for registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof. The City of Butuan asserts that Sec. 129 and Sec.133 of the Local Government Code is their basis for said ordinance and that, said provisions authorize LGUs to collect registration fees or charges along with, in its view, the corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles.

LTO explains that one of the functions of the National Government, that, indeed has been transferred to LGUs is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the LTFRB but NOT the authority of the LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.

The RTC of Butuan decreed an issuance of a PERMANENT WRIT OF INJUCTION against LTO prohibiting and enjoining LTO, as well as its employees and other persons acting in its behalf, from (a) registering tricycles and (b) issuing licenses to tricycle drivers. The CA sustained the trial court’s decision. The adverse rulings of both Courts prompted the LTO to file an instant petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the earlier Court decisions.

ISSUE

Whether or not under the present set-up the power of the LTO to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof has likewise devolved to Local Government Units.

RULING

No, under the present set-up the power of the LTO to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof has not likewise devolved to Local Government Units.

Under the Local Government Code (specifically Sec. 458 (8)(3)(VI)), the Local Government Units now have the power to REGULATE (to fix, establish or control, to adjust by rule, method or establish mode to direct by rule or restriction; or to subject to governing principles or laws) the operation of tricycles for hire and grant franchises thereof but they are still subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC (Department of Transportation and Communications; under Article 458(a) [3-VI] of the RA 7160).

In this case, said powers [to register and issue licenses] remain under LTO’s exclusive jurisdiction. The registration and licensing functions are vested in the LTO (pursuant to Art. 3 Sec. 4(d) [1], 10 of RA 4136-Land Transportation and Traffic Code) while franchising and regulatory responsibilities are vested in the LTFRB (Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board; pursuant to EO # 202).

Case Digest: Pangasinan Transportation, Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission, 70 Phil 221, G.R. No. 47065

 

Pangasinan Transportation, Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission, 70 Phil 221, G.R. No. 47065, June 26, 1940

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

PANTRANCO, a holder of an existing Certificate of Public Convenience is applying to operate additional buses with the Public Service Commission (PSC) has been engaged in transporting passengers in certain provinces by means of public transportation utility. Patranc applied for authorization to operate 10 additional trucks. The PSC granted the application but added several conditions for PANTRANCO’s compliance. One is that the service can be acquired by government upon payment of the cost price less depreciation, and that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time.

ISSUE

Whether or not PSC can impose said conditions, if so, wouldn’t this power of the PSC constitute an undue delegation of powers.

 RULING

Yes, there was valid delegation of powers.

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action at the same time forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. But due to the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation.”

All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

The welfare and interest of the public are the paramount considerations in determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular business. The State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police power, which is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. Therefore, requiring the government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.

Case Digest: Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500, G.R. No. 103982

 

Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500, G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Antonio Mecano is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the Commission on Audit.

Mecano requested for reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) which is a provision covering allowances of government employees in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. Undersecretary of Justice Bello III denied Mecano’s claim reasoning that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Admin. Code). Mecano then re-­submitted his claim with a copy of the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the Admin. Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the RAC, including the particular Section 699 of the latter as the repealing clause of the Admin. Code is merely a general repealing provision. The request was approved by the Department of Justice and forwarded to the Commission on Audit.

However, COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo denied Mecano’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Admin. Code, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-­enacted in the Admin. Code.

In the present petition, Mecano argue Sec. 699 of the RAC remains operative despite the enactment of the Admin. Code. On the other hand, COA contend that the enactment of the Admin. Code operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC as such was the clear intent of the legislature in enacting the Admin. Code.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Administrative Code repeal or abrogate Section 699 of the RAC.

RULING

No, the Administrative Code did not repeal or abrogate Sec. 699 of the RAC.

The Repealing Clause of the Admin. Code provides that “All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.” This is a general repealing provision (implied repeal) for it failed to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.

It is clear that there can be no implied repeal of Sec. 699 of the RAC by the Admin. Code. Under the first category, it was not established that there is any irreconcilable conflict between the two codes. Irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter;; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized;; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. The new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code In fact, there is no provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner in the Admin. Code. Nor is there implied repeal under the second category for such is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself and that it is clear intent of the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior act. As stated in the opinion of Secretary Drilon, the Admin. Code cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure.

It is a well-­settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. Hence, Sec. 699 of the RAC remains operative.

Case Digest: Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 114222

 

Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 114222, April 6, 1995

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

The petitioners, Francisco S. Tatad, John H. Osmena, and Rodolfo G. Biazon, who are members of the Philippine Senate, initiated a petition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Their objective was to prohibit the implementation and enforcement of the "Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" dated April 22, 1992, and the "Supplemental Agreement" dated May 6, 1993.

The respondents in this case include Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a private corporation organized under the laws of Hong Kong.

The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) had devised plans to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA, a major thoroughfare in Metropolitan Manila, known as EDSALRT III.Eli Levin Enterprises, Inc., proposed the construction of the EDSA LRT III on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis, in accordance with Republic Act No. 6957, also known as the BOT Law. This law outlined two financing schemes for government projects through private initiative and investment: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) or Build-Transfer (BT).

To facilitate the prequalification process for contractors, the DOTC established the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Technical Committee. The PBAC issued guidelines for prequalification, resulting in five groups responding, with the EDSA LRT Consortium meeting the specified criteria.

Secretary Pete Nicomedes Prado, who replaced Secretary Orbos, became involved in negotiations with the EDSA LRT Consortium. The negotiations were recommended to President Aquino, who instructed the DOTC to proceed, leading to the submission of a bid proposal by the EDSA LRT Consortium.

However, the contract signing faced procedural issues, as conveyed by Executive Secretary Orbos. Subsequent renegotiations resulted in the "Revised and Restated Agreement" and the "Supplemental Agreement."

President Fidel V. Ramos approved these agreements, officially designating EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd. as the owner of rail facilities for the EDSA LRT III project. 

ISSUE/S

1. Whether or not the petitioners, acting as Senators and taxpayers, have legal standing to challenge the constitutionality and validity of the agreements.

2. Whether or not a foreign corporation, EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd., can own EDSA LRT III, considering the constitutional requirement for Filipino ownership of public utilities.

3. Whether or not the BLT (Build-Lease-Transfer) scheme, not explicitly recognized in the BOT Law, is valid and within the scope of permissible arrangements.

RULING

1. The court affirms the legal standing of the petitioners, who are acting as Senators and taxpayers, to challenge the constitutionality and validity of the agreements. This ruling is grounded in the precedent set by the Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona case, allowing taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the government or government-owned corporations if they are believed to contravene the law. The court emphasizes that as long as this precedent stands, the petitioners have the right to raise legal challenges.

2. The court determines that EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd. is the owner and lessor of facilities, not a public utility. The distinction made between ownership and operation is crucial, as the Constitution requires Filipino ownership for the operation of a public utility, but not necessarily for ownership of facilities. The court clarifies that what constitutes a public utility is the use of facilities to serve the public, not their ownership. Therefore, the foreign ownership of EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd. is deemed acceptable as it pertains to ownership rather than operation.

3. The court accepts the BLT scheme as a valid variation within the context of the BOT Law. It emphasizes that the law does not explicitly preclude variations, and no provision restricts the arrangement for the payment by the government of the project cost. The court acknowledges that the burden on the government to raise funds is made lighter by allowing it to amortize payments out of the income from the operation of the LRT System. The court's decision underscores the flexibility of the law to accommodate variations and variations within the two recognized schemes.