Case Digest: American Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 482

 

American Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 482

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Democrito Mendoza purchased a conjunction ticket from Singapore Airlines for a multi-leg trip. In Geneva, Mendoza decided to skip Copenhagen and fly directly to New York. He exchanged the unused portion of his ticket for a one-way ticket from Geneva to New York with American Airlines.

Mendoza filed a lawsuit against American Airlines in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for damages before the regional trial court of Cebu for the alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva Airport.

The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of Philippine courts to entertain the said proceedings under Art. 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention. The trial court denied the motion. CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

The petitioner asserts that the Philippines is neither the domicile nor the principal place of business of the defendant airline; nor is it the place of destination. As regards the third option of the plaintiff, the petitioner contends that since the Philippines is not the place where the contract of carriage was made between the parties herein, Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over this action for damages.

ISSUE

Whether or not the contract of transportation between the petitioner and the private respondent would be considered as a single operation and part of the contract of transportation entered into by the latter with Singapore Airlines in Manila.

RULING

Yes, the contract of transportation between the parties is a single operation and part of the contract by Mendoza with Singapore Airlines.

Article 1(3) of the Warsaw Convention clearly states that a contract of air transportation is taken as a single operation whether it is founded on a single contract or a series of contracts. In addition, members of the IATA are under a general pool partnership agreement wherein they act as agents of each other in the issuance of tickets to contracted passengers.

In this case, when the petitioner accepted the unused portion of the conjunction tickets, entered it in the IATA clearing house, and undertook to transport the private respondent over the route covered by the unused portion of the conjunction tickets, i.e., Geneva to New York, the petitioner tacitly recognized its commitment under the IATA pool arrangement to act as agent of the principal contracting airline, Singapore Airlines, as to the segment of the trip the petitioner agreed to undertake. As such, the petitioner thereby assumed the obligation to take the place of the carrier originally designated in the original conjunction ticket. Therefore, there was no separate or second contract between American Airlines and Mendoza but a contract considered a single operation and part of the contract of transportation entered into by Mendoza with Singapore Airlines in Manila.

Case Digest: Anonuevo vs. Court of Appeals, 441 SCRA 24

Anonuevo vs. Court of Appeals, 441 SCRA 24

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred.

Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge.

Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets. He posits that Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.

ISSUE

Whether or not Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-motorized vehicles, making Villagracia presumptively negligent.

RULING

No.

Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.

In this case, Aonuevo’s characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the present. There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-motorized vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. Is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustibility due to the use of fuel.

Case Digest: Mallari vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128607

 

Mallari vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128607, January 31, 2000

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

the passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin Publishing Corp.) along the National Highway in Barangay San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan. The collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.

Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City against Alfredo Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr., and also against BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company. The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the death of Israel Reyes was caused by the fault and negligence of both drivers of the passenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van.

The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery van. Hence, the trial court ordered BULLETIN and Felix Angeles to pay jointly and severally Claudia G. Reyes, widow of the deceased victim. On appeal the CA reversed RTC’s decision absolving respondent BULLETIN, Felix Angeles and N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company. It ordered petitioners Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. to compensate Claudia G. Reyes. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr.

RULING

Yes, the collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr.

Under the law, a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left-hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.

In this case, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.

Case Digest: Baliwag Transit vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 746

 

Baliwag Transit vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 746

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

On July 31, 1980, Leticia Garcia and her five-year-old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus No. 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City. They took the seat behind the driver, Jaime Santiago. At around 7:30 in the evening, the bus passengers saw a cargo truck parked at the shoulder of the national highway. The truck driver, Julio Recontique, and his helper, Arturo Escala, were replacing a flat tire when Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed. Santiago failed to notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road, and the danger of collision became imminent.

Santiago and Escala died, and several others were injured. Leticia suffered a fracture in her pelvis and right leg, while Allan broke a leg and received emergency treatment. Spouses Antonio and Leticia Garcia sued Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading, and Julio Recontique for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. Baliwag, A & J Trading, and Recontique disclaimed responsibility for the mishap, claiming that the accident was caused solely by the fault and negligence of A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique.

ISSUE

Whether or not Baliwag Transit Bus is liable. 

RULING

Yes, Baliwag is liable. 

Under the law, a common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured.

In this case, Baliwag, a common carrier, is liable for damages due to its driver's recklessness in a bus accident. The evidence shows the driver's disregard for passengers' safety, leading to physical suffering and mental anguish. The accident resulted in Leticia Garcia's hip replacement and Allan's foot injury.

Case Digest: Pollard vs. NDC, G.R. No. 143866

 

Pollard vs. NDC, G.R. No. 143866, August 22, 2005

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Poliand is an assignee of the of the rights of Asian Hardwood over the outstanding obligation of National Development Corporation (NDC), the latter being the owner of Galleon which previously secured credit accommodations from Asian Hardwood for its expenses on provisions, oil, repair, among others. Galleon also obtained loans from Japanese lenders to finance acquisition of vessels which was guaranteed by DBP in consideration of a promise by Galleon to secure a first mortgage on the vessels. DBP later transferred ownership of the vessel to NDC.  A collection suit was filed after repeated demands of Poliand for the satisfaction of the obligation from Galleon, NDC and DBP went unheeded.

ISSUE

Whether or not Poliand has a maritime lien enforceable against NDC or DBP.

RULING

Yes, Poliand has a maritime lien which is more superior than DBP’s mortgage lien. Before POLIAND’s claim may be classified as superior to the mortgage constituted on the vessel, it must be shown to be one of the enumerated claims which Section 17, P.D. No. 1521 declares as having preferential status in the event of the sale of the vessel. One of such claims enumerated under Section 17, P.D. No. 1521 which is considered to be superior to the preferred mortgage lien is a maritime lien arising prior in time to the recording of the preferred mortgage. Such maritime lien is described under Section 21, P.D. No. 1521.

Under the aforequoted provision, the expense must be incurred upon the order of the owner of the vessel or its authorized person and prior to the recording of the ship mortgage. Under the law, it must be established that the credit was extended to the vessel itself.

In this case, the trial court found that GALLEON’s advances obtained from Asian Hardwood were used to cover for the payment of bunker oil/fuel, unused stores and oil, bonded stores, provisions, and repair and docking of the GALLEON vessels.

Case Digest: Crescent Petroleum vs. MV Lor, G.R. No. 155014

 

Crescent Petroleum vs. MV Lor, G.R. No. 155014, November 11, 2005

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean company.

Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada. November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil products for the use and operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils to the Vessel.

Petitioner Crescent granted and confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile dated November 2, 1995. Crescent received two (2) checks as security payment. Crescent then contracted the supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited, another Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.

On November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada and was acknowledge and received the delivery receipt by the Chief Engineer.    

On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar and was granted.

ISSUE

Whether or not Ship Mortgage Decree provides for relief to Crescent Petroleum for its unpaid claim.

RULING

Yes. 

Under P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978, the following are the requisites for maritime liens on necessaries to exist: (1) the "necessaries" must have been furnished to and for the benefit of the vessel; (2) the "necessaries" must have been necessary for the continuation of the voyage of the vessel; (3) the credit must have been extended to the vessel; (4) there must be necessity for the extension of the credit; and (5) the necessaries must be ordered by persons authorized to contract on behalf of the vessel.

In this case, Not enjoying the presumption of authority, petitioner Crescent should have proved that Portserv was authorized by the shipowner to contract for supplies. Thus, Crescent Petroleum failed.

Case Digest: United Airlines vs. Uy, G.R. No. 127768

 

United Airlines vs. Uy, G.R. No. 127768, November 19, 1999

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

In October 13, 1989, Willie J. Uy, a revenue passenger on United Airlines Flight No. 819 from San Francisco to Manila, faced humiliation from United Airlines employees over an overweight luggage issue. Despite complying with repacking, issues arose when the airline refused to honor his miscellaneous charge order (MCO) for overweight charges. Upon arrival in Manila, Uy discovered one of his bags had been slashed and its contents stolen, totaling around US $5,310.00. He notified United Airlines of his losses and sought reimbursement, but the airline offered payment based on the maximum liability of US $9.70 per pound. Uy made additional demands for an out-of-court settlement, which the airline rejected.

Legal proceedings ensued as on June 9, 1992, Uy filed a complaint against United Airlines, alleging ill treatment, humiliation, and property loss. United Airlines moved to dismiss, invoking Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention, citing a two-year limitation for filing damages from the date of arrival. Uy argued for reconciliation with local laws determining the period of limitation. The trial court granted United Airlines' motion, asserting the action must be brought within two years from arrival, excluding local interruption rules. Despite Uy's motion for reconsideration, the trial court denied it. Subsequently, Uy filed a notice of appeal two days after receiving the denial order. United Airlines moved for dismissal, asserting the notice of appeal was filed out of time.

The Court of Appeals, citing relevant jurisprudence allowing the review of orders despite procedural lapses, accepted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Warsaw Convention did not override the Civil Code and other laws, asserting Uy's cause of action had not prescribed. Dissatisfied, United Airlines filed a petition for review on certiorari, challenging the timeliness of the notice of appeal and contesting the applicability of the Warsaw Convention.

ISSUE

1. Whether the notice of appeal was timely filed.

2. Whether Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention should apply to the case.

RULING

1. The Court, considering the unique and peculiar facts of the case and the serious question of law it poses, inclined to give due course to the appeal despite the two-day delay in filing the notice of appeal.

2. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the Warsaw Convention did not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other laws. While respondent's second cause of action was time-barred under the Warsaw Convention, the delaying tactics employed by United Airlines justified the filing of the action beyond the prescribed period. Therefore, respondent's second cause of action could proceed.