Case Digest: Yangco vs. Laserna, 73 Phil. 330, G.R. No. L-47447-47449

 

Yangco vs. Laserna, 73 Phil. 330, G.R. No. L-47447-47449, October 29, 1941

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

The steamer S.S. Negros, belonging to petitioner, Teodoro R. Yangco, left the port of Romblon on its return trip to Manila. Typhoon signal No. 2 was up, of which the captain was duly advised, however, the vessel proceeded to set sail.

The boat encountered strong winds and rough seas. As the sea became increasingly violent, the captain ordered the vessel to turn left, evidently to return to port, but in the maneuver, the vessel was caught sidewise by a big wave which caused it to capsize and sink.

The respondents instituted in CFI of Capiz separate civil actions against the petitioner to recover damages for the death of their loved ones. The court awarded the heirs of Antolin and Victorioso Aldana the sum of P2,000; the heirs of Casiana Laserna, P590; and those of Genaro Basana, also P590.

After the rendition of the judgment to this effect, the petitioner by a verified pleading, sought to abandon the vessel to the plaintiffs in the three cases, together with all its equipment, without prejudice to his right to appeal. The abandonment having been denied, an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, wherein all the judgments were affirmed except that which sums were increased to P4,000.

Petitioner, now deceased, appealed and is here represented by his legal representative.

ISSUE

Whether or not the shipowner or agent, notwithstanding the total loss of the vessel as a result of the negligence of its captain, be properly held liable in damages for the consequent death of its passengers.

RULING

No, the shipowner cannot be properly held liable.

Under the law, the agent shall be civilly liable for the indemnities in favor of third persons which arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which the vessel carried; but he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her equipment and the freight he may have earned during the voyage.

In this case, it is a fact that the ill-fated steamship Negros, as a vessel engaged in interisland trade, is a common carrier and that the relationship between the petitioner and the passengers who died in the mishap rests on a contract of carriage. Assuming that the petitioner is liable for a breach of contract of carriage, the exclusively "real and hypothecary nature" of maritime law operates to limit such liability to the value of the vessel, or the insurance thereon, if any. However, it does not appear that the vessel was insured. The abandonment of the vessel sought by the petitioner is immaterial. The vessel having perished, any act of abandonment would be an idle ceremony. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be properly held liable in damages for the consequent death of its passengers. 

Case Digest: Philippine National Bank vs. CA, 337 SCRA 381, G.R. No. 128661

 

Philippine National Bank vs. CA, 337 SCRA 381, G.R. No. 128661, August 8, 2000

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

To finance the acquisition of 7 shipping vessels, the Philippine International Shipping Corporation (PISC) applied for and was granted by National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) guaranty accommodations. As security for these guaranty accommodations, PISC executed chattel mortgages on the vessels to be acquired by it.

Meanwhile, PISC entered into a contract with Hong Kong United Dockyards, Ltd. for the repair and conversion of one of the vessels, M/V Asean Liberty. The Central Bank of the Philippines authorized PISC to open with China Banking Corporation (CBC) a standby letter of credit for US$545,000 in favor of Citibank, N.A. to cover the repair and partial conversion of the vessel M/V Asean Liberty.

PISC executed an Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit for US$545,000 with CBC in favor of Citibank. CBC then issued its Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit forUS$545,000 in favor of Citibank for the account of PISC. PISC executed a promissory note for US$545,000 in favor of Citibank pursuant to the Loan Agreement between PISC and Citibank.

Upon failure of PISC to fulfill its obligations, Citibank sent CBC a letter drawing on the Letter of Credit. CBC then instructed its correspondent Irving Trust Co. to pay to Citibank the amount of US$242,225. Subsequently, for failure of PISC to settle its obligations under the guaranty accommodations, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) conducted an auction sale of the mortgaged vessels. NIDC emerged as the highest bidder in these auctions. PISC, claiming that the foreclosure sale of its mortgaged vessels was illegal and irregular, instituted a civil case for the annulment of the foreclosure and auction sale. CBC filed a complaint in intervention for recovery upon a maritime lien against the proceeds of the sale of the foreclosed vessels.

ISSUE

Whether or not CBC’s claim as evidenced by its Irrevocable Letter of Credit is in the nature of a maritime lien under the provisions of P.D. No. 1521.

RULING

Yes, CBC’s claim as evidenced by its Irrevocable Letter of Credit is a maritime lien under the provisions of P.D. No. 1521.

Under the provisions of P.D. No. 1521, any person furnishing repairs, supplies, or other necessities to a vessel on credit will have a maritime lien. Such maritime lien, if it arose prior to the recording of a preferred mortgage lien, shall have priority over the said mortgage lien.

In this case, it was Hong Kong United Dockyards, Ltd. Which originally possessed a maritime lien over the vessel M/V Asean Liberty by virtue of its repair of the said vessel on credit. CBC, however, stands as guarantor of the loan extended by Citibank to PISC. It was Citibank which advanced the money to PISC. It was only upon the failure of PISC to fulfill its obligations under its promissory note to Citibank that CBC was called upon by Citibank to exercise its duties under the Stand by Letter of Credit.

Case Digest: Barrios vs. Go Thing, 7 SCRA 535, G.R. No. L17192

Barrios vs. Go Thing, 7 SCRA 535, G.R. No. L17192, March 30, 1963

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Petitioner Honorio Barrios, captain and/or master of the MV Henry I, received or otherwise intercepted an S.O.S. distress signal by blinkers from the MV Alfredo, owned and/or operated by respondent Carlos Go Thong & Company. Thereafter, he altered the course of said vessel, and steered and headed towards the beckoning MV Don Alfredo, which Barrios found to be in trouble, due to engine failure and the loss of her propeller. Upon getting close to the MV Don Alfreco, with the consent and knowledge of the captain and/or master of the MV Don Alfredo, Barrios caused the latter vessel to be tied to, or well-secured and connected with tow lines from the MV Henry, and proceeded moving until such time that a sister ship of MV Don Alfredo was sighted so that the tow lines were also released. Brought to the CFI of Manila, the court therein dismissed the case; with cost against Barrios. Barrios interposed an appeal.

ISSUE

Whether or not the service rendered by plaintiff to the defendant constituted "salvage" or "towage", and if so, whether the plaintiff may recover from the defendant compensation for such service.

RULING

No, it is not a salvage service.

Salvage defined “Salvage” has been defined as “the compensation allowed to persons by whose assistance a ship or her cargo has been saved, in whole or in part, from impending peril on the sea, or in recovering such property from actual loss, as in case of shipwreck, derelict, or recapture.”  Three elements are necessary to a valid salvage claim, namely, (1) a marine peril, (2) service voluntarily rendered when not required as an existing duty or from a special contract, and (3) success in whole or in part, or that the service rendered contributed to such success.

In this case, no marine peril to justify valid salvage claim by Barrios against Go Thong. In case of danger of stranding, its anchor could be released, to prevent such occurrence. There was no danger that Go Thong’s vessel would sink given the smoothness of the sea and the fairness of the weather. That danger was absent shown by the fact that said vessel or its crew did not even find it necessary to lower its launch and two motor boats, to evacuate its passengers aboard. Neither did they find occasion to jettison the vessel’s cargo as a safety measure. Neither the passengers nor the cargo were in danger of perishing. All that the vessel’s crew members could not do was to move the vessel on its own power. That did not make the vessel a quasi-derelict. Contract of towage perfected even without written agreement

In consenting to Barrios’ offer to tow the vessel, Go Thong (through the captain of its vessel MV Don Alfredo) thereby impliedly entered into a juridical relation of “towage” with the owner of the vessel MV Henry I, captained by Barrios, the William Lines. Only the owner is entitled to remuneration in towage If the contract thus created is one for towage, then only the owner of the towing vessel, to the exclusion of the crew of the said vessel, may be entitled to remuneration.

Case Digest: Compania vs. Allied Workers, 77 SCRA 24, G.R. No. 107653

 

Compania vs. Allied Workers, 77 SCRA 24, G.R. No. 107653, February 05, 1996

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

In 1952, the Compañia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the consignees. vessels at Iligan City. The union agreed to the stipulation that the company would not be liable for the payment of the services of the union "for the loading, unloading and deliveries of cargoes" and that the compensation for such services would be paid "by the owners and consignees of the cargoes" as "has been the practice in the port of Iligan City" of which the union found out later to be oppressive.

The shippers and consignees paid the union for the arrastre work only. They claimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the bill of lading provided that the unloading of the cargo was at the shipowner's expense.

The union filed in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a petition praying that it be certified as the sole collective bargaining unit. Despite the case, the company served a written notice on the union that in accordance with payment of the 1952 contract, the same would be terminated. Because of that notice, the union later on filed in the CIR charges of unfair labor practices against the company.

The company entered into a new stevedoring and arrastre contract with the Iligan Stevedoring Association. On the following day, the union members picketed the wharf and prevented the Iligan Stevedoring Association from performing arrastre and stevedoring work.

The company sued the union and its officers in the CFI of Lanao for the rescission of the 1952 contract, to enjoin the union from interfering with the loading and unloading of the cargo, and for the recovery of damages.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of the company and awarded CM 450K as damages; it held that the officers of the union are solidarily liable for this amount. Union appealed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the evidence presented by Compania Maritima warrants the award of damages in its favor.

RULING

No, it does not warrant.

In this case, the company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole", the original writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court).

Sc held that the rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly established. It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross-examination. What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like". That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court.

Case Digest: Summa Insurance vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175, G.R. No. 84860

 

Summa Insurance vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175, G.R. No. 84860, February 06, 1996

Subject: Transportation Law

 

FACTS

The S/S "Galleon Sapphire", a vessel owned by the National Galleon Shipping Corporation (NGSC), arrived at Pier 3, South Harbor, Manila, carrying a shipment consigned to the order of Caterpillar Far East Ltd. with Semirara Coal Corporation (Semirara) as "notify party". The shipment, including a bundle of PC 8 U blades. The shipment was discharged to the custody of private respondent, formerly known as E. Razon, Inc., the exclusive arrastre operator at the South Harbor. Accordingly, three good-order cargo receipts were issued by NGSC, duly signed by the ship's checker and a representative of private respondent.

The forwarder, Sterling International Brokerage Corporation, withdrew the shipment from the pier and loaded it on the barge "Semirara 8104". However, when Semirara inspected the shipment at its warehouse, the bundle of PC8U blades was missing.

Semirara then filed with petitioner, private respondent and NGSC its claim for the value of the lost bundle. Petitioner paid Semirara the invoice value of the lost shipment. Semirara thereafter executed a release of claim and subrogation receipt. Consequently, petitioner filed its claims with NGSC and private respondent but it was unsuccessful.

The petitioner then filed a complaint with the RTC of Manila against NGSC and private respondent for collection of a sum of money, damages and attorney's fees.

The trial court rendered a decision absolving NGSC from any liability but finding private respondent liable to petitioner. On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the trial court and reduced private respondent's liability. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not an arrastre operator is legally liable for the loss of a shipment in its custody.

RULING

Yes, the arrastre operator is legally liable for the loss of a shipment in its custody.

Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code and Section 3(8) of the Warehouse Receipts Law, being the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operator's duty is to take good care of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their possession.

In this case, the relationship therefore between the consignee and the arrastre operator s much akin to that existing between the consignee or owner of shipped goods and the common carrier, or that between a depositor and a warehouseman. In the performance of its obligations, an arrastre operator should observe the same degree of diligence as that required of a common carrier and a warehouseman as enunciated from the above provision. It has been established that the shipment was lost while in the custody of private respondent. We find private respondent liable for the loss.

Case Digest: Brillo vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 383, G.R. No. 109090

 

Brillo vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 383, G.R. No. 109090, August 07, 1996

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Daily Overland Express, Inc. was a forwarding business that charged freight for goods from Legaspi City to Manila. Brillo Handicrafts, Inc. was one of its regular customers, with an outstanding balance of P153,204.10. Daily filed a complaint in December 1990 for the balance, claiming it was exorbitant and overstated. The matter was referred to a certified public accountant, who calculated the liability as P109,741.66 and the defendant's insisted rate of P2.20 per ton per kilometer. The trial court had to determine which computation was applicable in the case. The Regional Manager of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board informed the trial court that the fixed rate was issued by the Philippine Federation of Petroleum Haulers Association, not Daily.

ISSUE

Whether or not appellant is liable for the balance of freight.

RULING

Yes, the applicable rate for freight charges should be the one agreed upon by the parties, and it should have the force of law between them, if a party has already partially paid the amount and did not object to the rate being charged, they cannot belatedly challenge the amount being collected. Estoppel may set in if a party has engaged in a business relationship for a ling time without objecting to the billing.

In this case, appellant has engaged the trucking services of plaintiff years before this litigation. Plaintiff has been charging freight rates to which defendant never objected. it would have been easily for appellant to manifest its objection to plaintiff's billing from the start of their business relations, but it did not. Appellant was silent for so long a time until this suit was filed against it. It was too late, estoppel had already set in.

Case Digest: Litonjua Shipping Company Inc. vs. National Seamen Board, G.R. No. L-51910

 

Litonjua Shipping Company Inc. vs. National Seamen Board, G.R. No. L-51910, August 10, 1989

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Petitioner is the duly appointed local crewing managing office of the Fairwind Shipping Corporation. On September 11, 1976 M/V Dufton Bay an ocean-going vessel of foreign registry owned by the R.D. Mullion ship broking agency under charter by Fairwind, while in the port of Cebu contracted the services (among others) of Gregorio Candongo as Third Engineer for 12 months with a monthly wage of US$500.00. The agreement was executed before the Cebu Area Manning Unit of the NSB, after which respondent boarded the vessel.

On December 28, 1976 before the expiration of contract, respondent was required to disembark at Port Kilang, Malaysia. Describe in his seaman’s handbook is the reason “by owner’s arrange.”

Condongo filed a complaint against Mullion (Shipping company) for violation of contract and against Litonjua as agent of shipowner. On February 1977, NSB rendered a judgment by default for failure of petitioners to appear during the initial hearing, rendering the same to pay Candongo because there was no sufficient or valid cause for the respondents to terminate the service of the complainant.

Litonjua contends that the shipowner, nor the charterer, was the employer of private respondent; and that liability for damages cannot be imposed upon petitioner which was a mere agent of the charterer.

ISSUE

Whether or not the charterer Fairwind was properly regarded as the employer of private respondent Candongo whom will be liable for damages.

RULING

No, the charterer Fairwind was properly regarded as the employer of private respondent Candongo whom will be liable for damages.

Under the law, a time charter, upon the other hand, like a demise charter, is a contract for the use of a vessel for a specified period of time or for the duration of one or more specified voyages. The owner of a time-chartered vessel retains possession and control through the master and crew who remain his employees. What the time charterer acquires is the right to utilize the carrying capacity and facilities of the vessel and to designate her destinations during the term of the charter. A voyage charter, or trip charter, is simply a contract of affreightment, that is, a contract for the carriage of goods, from one or more ports of loading to one or more ports of unloading, on one or on a series of voyages. In a voyage charter, master and crew remain in the employ of the owner of the vessel.

In this case, NSB decision was affirmed by the SC. It is the respondent Litonjua Shipping Co., Inc. is the authorized Philippine agent of Fairwind Shipping Corporation, charterer of the vessel 'Dufton Bay, wherein complainant, served as 3rd Engineer from 17 September until disembarkation on December 28, 1976. It is also clear from the complainant's wages account bearing the heading 'Fairwind Shipping Corporation', signed by the Master of the vessel that the Philippine agency referred to herein directed to pay the said withdrawn wages of $13.19 is no other than Litonjua Shipping Company, Inc. Thus, Litonjua Shipping is liable for the damages before private respondent.