Case Digest: Magsaysay vs. Agan, 96 Phil. 504, G.R. No. L6393

 

Magsaysay vs. Agan, 96 Phil. 504, G.R. No. L6393, January 31, 1955

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

The S S "San Antonio", vessel owned and operated by plaintiff bound for Basco, Batanes, vis Aparri, Cagayan, with general cargo belonging to different shippers, among them the defendant. It made a day's stopover and while in Aparri port, it ran aground at the mouth of the Cagayan river. In attempt to refloat it, plaintiff employed the Luzon Stevedoring Co. at an agreed compensation.

The plaintiff brought the present action in the CFI of Manila to make defendant pay his contribution on the expenses incurred in refloating the vessel which constitutes the general average and shared by the cargo owners.

Defendant, in his answer, denies liability to his amount, alleging, among other things, that the stranding of the vessel was due to the fault, negligence and lack of skill of its master.

After trial, the lower court found for plaintiff and rendered judgment against the defendant for the amount of the claim, with legal interests. Hence, this petition by the defendant.

ISSUE

Whether or not the expenses incurred in floating a vessel so stranded should be considered general average and shared by the cargo owners.

RULING

No, the expenses cannot be considered general average and shared by the cargo owners.

Under the law, the following are requisites for the general average: (1) there must be a common danger; (2) that for the common safety part of the vessel or of the cargo or both is sacrificed deliberately; (3) that from the expenses or damages caused follows the successful saving of the vessel and cargo; and (4) that the expenses or damages should have been incurred or inflicted after taking proper legal steps and authority.

In this case, concerning the requisites for the general average: (1) the evidence does not disclose that the expenses sought to be recovered from the defendant were incurred to save the vessel and cargo from a common danger; (2) the expenses in question were not incurred for the common safety of vessel and cargo, since they, or at least the cargo, were not in imminent peril; (3) the sacrifice was for the benefit of the vessel to enable it to proceed to destination and not to save the cargo, thus, the cargo owners are not in law bound to contribute to the expenses; and lastly, (4) it does not appear that the expenses here in question were incurred after following the procedure laid down in article 813 of the Code of Commerce. Absent all requisites, this case is not made out for the general average. Therefore, the expenses cannot be shared by the cargo owners. 

Case Digest: Yu Con vs. Ipil, 41 Phil 770, G.R.No. 10195

 

Yu Con vs. Ipil, 41 Phil 770, G.R. No. 10195, December 29, 1916

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Yu Con, a merchant from San Nicolas, Cebu, had chartered a banca named Maria from Narciso Lauron for the transportation of merchandise and money. On 17 October 1911, Yu Con delivered P450 to Ipil and Solamo, master and supercargo of the banca, for delivery to Ipil and Solamo's shop in Catmon. However, the money disappeared on 18 October, and no investigation was conducted.

Yu Con sued to recover the lost sum, claiming it was due to the defendants' negligence or abandonment of their duty. The court concluded that Lauron was responsible for the negligence, and Yu Con was entitled to recover the lost amount. Judgment was rendered on 20 April 1914, favoring Yu Con and Ipil, et. al., for P450, with interest at 6% per annum from the complaint's filing.

ISSUE

Whether or not the banca may be considered as a vessel and whether or not Glicerio Ipil, as a master, may be considered as the captain in the determination of liability.

RULING

YES. The text discusses the legal relationship between Yu Con and defendant Narciso Lauron, who owned a banca called Maria. The term "vessel" refers to any kind of craft, regardless of its technical name or future nautical advancements. In maritime commerce, "captain" and "master" have the same meaning, both being chiefs or commanders of ships. In the Philippines, the Code of Commerce compares masters with captains, with masters governing vessels that navigate high seas or ships of large dimensions and importance, and masters commanding smaller ships engaged exclusively in coastwise trade. The agent is civilly liable for indemnities in favor of third persons arising from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods the vessel carried. In this case, defendant Narciso Lauron should be held civilly liable to the plaintiff for the loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 belonging to the plaintiff and delivered to the master and supercargo.

 

Case Digest: Wallem Maritime vs. NLRC, 263 SCRA 174, G.R. No. 108433

 

Wallem Maritime vs. NLRC, 263 SCRA 174, G.R. No. 108433, October 15, 1996

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Macatuno and Gurimbao (respondents) were dismissed from work due to an incident wherein they allegedly caused harm to an apprentice. The captain summoned private respondent and Gurimbao. With the head of the deck crew (bosun), they went to the captain's cabin. The captain told them to pack up their things as their services were being terminated. They would disembark at the next port, the Port of Ube, from where they would be flown home to the Philippines, the repatriation expenses to be shouldered by them.

The two attempted to explain their side of the incident but the captain ignored them and firmly told them to go home. Before disembarking, they were entrusted by the bosun with a letter of their fellow crew members, addressed to Captain Diño, attesting to their innocence.

At the Port of Ube, an agent of the company handed them their plane tickets and accompanied them the following day to the Fukuoka Airport where they boarded a Cathay Pacific airplane bound for Manila. The evidence presented to support this claim was a copy of the official logbook. It stated that the respondents were acting violently. The logbook was objected to due to being hearsay evidence and was affirmed.

ISSUE

Whether or not captain of the M/T Fortuna may discharge private respondent and Gurimbao without just cause.

RULING

No.

Under the law, Art 637 of Title VII Commercial Contracts for Transportation Overland states that “ Neither can the captain discharge a sailor during the time of his contract except for just cause: (1) the perpetration of a crime, which disturbs order on the vessel; (2) Repeated offenses of insubordination, of want of discipline, or of non- fulfilment of the service; (3) Incapacity and repeated negligence in the fulfillment of the service he should render; (4) habitual drunkenness; (5) any occurrence, which incapacitates the sailor to perform the work under his charge, with the exception of the provisions contained in Art 644; and (6) desertion.

In this case, no investigation report was presented to prove that complainant was given the opportunity to air his side of the incident. Further, copy of the alleged official logbook was not properly authenticated. The authentication is necessary specially so since this document is the only piece of evidence submitted by respondents.

Case Digest: Remigio vs. NLRC, 487 SCRA 190, G.R. No. 159887

Remigio vs. NLRC, 487 SCRA 190, G.R. No. 159887, April 12, 2006

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Bernardo Remigio entered into a Contract of Employment with C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. for a position on board SS "Enchanted Isle," owned by New Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. Petitioner experienced severe chest pain while ashore in Cancun, Mexico, and later underwent triple coronary artery bypass surgery in April 1998.

After being repatriated to Manila, petitioner demanded unpaid wages, sickness allowance, and permanent total disability benefits, but the demand was refused. The Labor Arbiter awarded sickness allowance but denied disability benefits, stating that the illness was not listed in the Schedule of Disability under the 1996 POEA SEC. The NLRC affirmed the decision, and the CA upheld it, finding no substantial evidence of work-related disability.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

RULING

Yes, the petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

In this case, despite the illness not being listed in the Schedule of Disability, the Court held that the 1996 POEA SEC is not exclusive, and the unqualified phrase "during the term" covers all injuries or illnesses occurring in the contract's lifetime. The Court found that petitioner suffered permanent total disability as he was unfit for duty for at least 11-13 months, constituting loss of earning capacity. The company-designated physician's certification further supported this finding. The Court awarded US$60,000.00 for permanent total disability benefits, US$3,428.00 for sickness allowance, and attorney's fees.

Case Digest: Sweet Lines vs. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 769, G.R. No. L-46340

 

Sweet Lines vs. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 769, G.R. No. L-46340, April 28, 1983

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Private respondents purchased first- class tickets from petitioner at the latter's office in Cebu City. They were to board petitioner's vessel, M/V Sweet Grace, bound for Catbalogan, Western Samar. Instead of departing at the scheduled hour of about midnight on July 8, 1972, the vessel set sail at 3:00 A.M. of July 9, 1972 only to be towed back to Cebu due to engine trouble, arriving there at about 4:00 P.M. on the same day. Repairs having been accomplished, the vessel lifted anchor again on July 10, 1972 at around 8:00 A.M.

Instead of docking at Catbalogan, which was the first port of call, the vessel proceeded direct to Tacloban at around 9:00 P.M. of July 10, 1972. Private respondents had no recourse but to disembark and board a ferryboat to Catbalogan.

Hence, this suit for damages for breach of contract of carriage which the Trial Court, affirmed by respondent Appellate Court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the owner of the vessel and the ship agent is liable for the acts of the captain for damages for by-passing a court of call without previous notice.

RULING

Yes, the owner of the vessel and the ship agent is liable for the acts of the captain for damages for by-passing a court of call without previous notice.

Article 614 of the Code of Commerce states that a captain who, having agreed to make a voyage, fails to fulfill his undertaking, without being prevented by fortuitous event or force majeure, shall indemnify all the losses which his failure may cause, without prejudice to criminal penalties which may be proper.

In this case, there was no fortuitous event or force majeure which prevented the vessel from fulfilling its undertaking of taking private respondents to Catbalogan. The voyage to Catbalogan was "interrupted" by the captain upon instruction of management. The "interruption" was not due to fortuitous event or for majeure nor to disability of the vessel. Having been caused by the captain upon instruction of management, the passengers' right to indemnity is evident. The owner of a vessel and the ship agent shall be civilly liable for the acts of the captain.

Case Digest: Inter-Orient vs. NLRC, 235 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 115286

 

Inter-Orient vs. NLRC, 235 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 115286, August 11, 1994

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as Oiler on board the vessel, MV Amazonia, from Dec. 21, 1988  to Sept. 28,1989. When he finished his contract, he was discharged from the port of Dubai for repatriation to Manila. During his layover in Bangkok, Thailand, he disembarked on his own free will and failed to join the connecting flight to Hongkong. During which, he was shot by a Thai Policeman and died. The police report submitted to the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok confirmed that it was Pineda who ‘approached and tried to stab the police sergeant with a knife and that therefore he was forced to pull out his gun and shot Pineda.

The deceased’s mother, Constancia Pineda, filed for death compensation benefits against Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and it foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation and the Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. They averred that the deceased seaman was suffering from mental disorder aggravated by threats on his life by his fellow seamen, the Ship Captain should not have allowed him to travel alone.

Respondent agency averred that they are not liable to pay any death/burial benefits pursuant to the provisions of Par. 6, Section C, Part II, POEA-SEC which states that ‘no compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willfull act on his own life by the seaman’; that the deceased seaman died due to his own wilfull act in attacking a policeman in Bangkok who shot him in self-defense.” 

ISSUE

Whether or not the local crewing or manning agent and its foreign principal are liable for the death of a Filipino seaman-employee who, after having been discharged, was killed in-transit while being repatriated home.

RULING

Yes, the local crewing or manning agent and its foreign principal are liable for the death of a Filipino seaman-employee. Though the termination of the employment contract was duly effected in Dubai, still, the responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was duly repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted.

Section 4, Rule VIII of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment clearly provides for the duration of the mandatory personal accident and life insurance covering accidental death, dismemberment and disability of overseas workers: “Section 4. Duration of Insurance Coverage.—The minimum coverage shall take effect upon payment of the premium and shall be extended worldwide, on and off the job, for the duration of the worker’s contract plus 60 calendar days after termination of the contract of employment’, provided that in no case shall the duration of the insurance coverage be less than one year.”

The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone is appalling.

Case Digest: Heirs of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 649, G.R. No. 51165

 

Heirs of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 649, G.R. No. 51165, June 21, 1990

Subject: Transportation Law

FACTS

This is a complaint originally filed on October 21, 1968 and amended on October 24, 1968 by the heirs of Delos Santos and others as pauper litigants against the Compania Maritima, for damages due to the death of several passengers as a result of the sinking of the vessel of defendant, the M/V 'Mindoro' when it met typhoon 'Welming' on the Sibuyan Sea, Aklan on November 4, 1967.

The plaintiff of the case alleged that the ship was overloaded evidenced by letters, radiograms, stenographic notes and corroborated testimonies of surviving passengers of M/V Mindoro.

Defendants alleged that the ship's compliment (sic) and crew were all complete and the vessel was in seaworthy condition. If the M/V Mindoro' sank, it was through force majeure.

The trial court sustained the position of private respondent Compania Maritima in view of lack of sufficient evidence, the case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED. The counterclaim was also DISMISSED.

On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision of trial court. While it found that there was concurring negligence on the part of the captain which must be imputable to Maritima, the CA ruled that Maritima cannot be held liable in damages based on the principle of limited liability of the shipowner or ship agent under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce.

ISSUE

Whether or not Article 587 of the Code of Commerce is only for the goods which the vessel carries and do not include the passengers.

RULING

No, Article 587 of the Code of Commerce does not apply only for the goods but also include the passengers.

Under the law, a shipowner or agent has the right of abandonment; and by necessary implication, his liability is confined to that which he is entitled as of right to abandon-"the vessel with all her equipment and the freight it may have earned during the voyage".

In this case, contrary to the petitioners' supposition, the limited liability doctrine applies not only to the goods but also in all cases like death or injury to passengers wherein the shipowner or agent may properly be held liable for the negligent or illicit acts of the captain. Article 587 speaks only of situations where the fault or negligence is committed solely by the captain. In cases where the shipowner is likewise to be blamed, Article 587 does not apply instead it shall be covered by the provisions of the New Civil Code on Common Carriers. Evidence on record shows that Maritima's lack of extraordinary diligence coupled with the negligence of the captain as found by the appellate court were the proximate causes of the sinking of M/V Mindoro. Hence, Maritima is liable for the deaths and injury of the victims.