Case Digest: LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY vs Navidad, et.al., G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY vs Navidad, et.al., G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003

Subject: Transportation Law

 

FACTS

Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token representing payment of the fare. While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. An altercation between the two ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck and killed instantaneously by the moving train. The widow of Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband.

The trial court ordered Prudent Security and Escartin to pay damages. On appeal, the appellate court exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. The appellate court ruled that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token.

ISSUE

Whether or not there exists a contract of carriage to make LRTA liable, as common carrier.

RULING

Yes, there exists a contract of carriage which will make LRTA, a common carrier, liable for the death of Natividad.

Under the law, common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.

In this case, a contract of carriage was created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation. LRTA is liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier. The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. Also, in the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities.

Case Digest: ALU-TUCP, et.al., vs. NLRC et.al., G.R. No. 109902

ALU-TUCP, et.al., vs. NLRC et.al., G.R. No. 109902 August 2, 1994

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS

On 5 July 1990, Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioners “regular project employees who shall continue their employment as such for as long as such [project] activity exists,” but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials.

The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform work in a specific undertaking — the Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been determined at the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.

The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that they are “regular” employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are “necessary, desirable and work-related to private respondent’s main business, steel-making”; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6) or more years to private respondent NSC.

ISSUE:

whether or not petitioners are properly characterized as "project employees" rather than "regular employees" of NSC.

Ruling:

YES.

The present case therefore strictly falls under the definition of "project employees" on paragraph one of Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended. Moreover, it has been held that the length of service of a project employee is not the controlling test of employment tenure but whether or not "the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee.

In this case, the employment of each "project worker" is dependent and co-terminus with the completion or termination of the specific activity or undertaking for which he was hired which has been pre-determined at the time of engagement. Since, there is no showing that they (13 complainants) were engaged to perform work-related activities to the business of respondent which is steel making, there is no logical and legal sense of applying to them the proviso under the second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended

Case Digest: O'Connor v. Oakhurst Dairy - 851 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2017)

O'Connor v. Oakhurst Dairy - 851 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2017)

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS

Plaintiffs Kevin O'Connor and four others ("Drivers") worked as delivery drivers for defendant Oakhurst Dairy ("Oakhurst"). The Drivers filed a lawsuit against Oakhurst in federal district court seeking unpaid overtime wages under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.S.  201 et seq., and the Maine overtime law, 26 M.R.S.A.  664(3).

 The matter was referred to a magistrate judge, and the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment to resolve their dispute over whether the Drivers were covered by Exemption F of Maine's minimum wage and overtime law. Exemption F stated that the protection of the overtime law did not apply to certain listed occupations, and particularly work that involved the "packing for shipment or distribution" of agricultural produce, meat and fish products, and perishable foods.

The Drivers contended that they fell outside of Exemption F and thus the overtime law protected them. Oakhurst argued to the contrary. The magistrate judge recommended that Oakhurst's motion for summary judgment be granted, and that the Drivers' motion be denied. The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and granted Oakhurst summary judgment. The Drivers appealed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the drivers fall within Exemption F of Maine's overtime law.

RULING

No.

The appellate court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The court observed that 664(3) omitted a final comma after the word "shipment," and thus there was an ambiguity as to whether it referred to two distinct exempt activities—"packing for shipment" and "distribution," and the act's legislative history did not cure that ambiguity.

Maine's default rule of construction, which required that wage and hours law be liberally construed to further its remedial purpose, favored a narrow reading, such as that urged by the Drivers. The court adopted the Drivers' interpretation: 664(3) referred to the single activity of "packing," whether the "packing" was for "shipment" or for "distribution," and although the Drivers handled perishable foods, they did not engage in "packing" them. As a result, the Drivers fell outside Exemption F.

Exemption F covers employees whose work involves the handling—in one way or another—of certain, expressly enumerated food products. Specifically, Exemption F states that the protection of the overtime law does not apply to: The canning, processing, preserving, freezing, drying, marketing, storing, packing for shipment or distribution of: (1) Agricultural produce; (2) Meat and fish products; and (3) Perishable foods. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, 664(3)(F).

Case Digest: Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. vs CA, et. al., G.R. No. 117188

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. vs CA, et. al., G.R. No. 117188

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS

On August 7, 1997, Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. (LGVHAI) was organized on 8 February 1983 as the homeowners' association for Loyola Grand Villas. It was also registered as the sole homeowners' association in the said village with the Home Financing Corporation (which eventually became Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation ["HIGC"]).

However, the association was not able file its corporate by-laws. The LGVHAI officers then tried to register its By-Laws in 1988, but they failed to do so. They then discovered that there were two other homeowners' organizations within the subdivision - the Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (North) Association, Inc. [North Association] and herein Petitioner Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. ["South Association].

Upon inquiry by the LGVHAI to HIGC, it was discovered that LGVHAI was dissolved for its failure to submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code and for its non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the association's activities. These paved the way for the formation of the North and South Associations. LGVHAI then lodged a complaint with HIGC Hearing Officer Danilo Javier and questioned the revocation of its registration.

Hearing Officer Javier ruled in favor of LGVHAI, revoking the registration of the North and South Associations. Petitioner South Association appealed the ruling, contending that LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code effectively automatically dissolved the corporation. The Appeals Board of the HIGC and the Court of Appeals both rejected the contention of the Petitioner affirmed the decision of Hearing Officer Javier.

ISSUE

W/N LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation.

RULING

No.

The pertinent provision of the Corporation Code that is the focal point of controversy in this case states: Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws. - Every corporation formed under this Code, must within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws for its government not inconsistent with this Code.

Ordinarily, the word "must" connote an imposition of duty which must be enforced. However, the word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not always imperative. It may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. If the language of a statute, considered as a whole with due regard to its nature and object, reveals that the legislature intended to use the words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning. Moreover, By-Laws may be necessary to govern the corporation, but By-Laws are still subordinate to the Articles of Incorporation and the Corporation Code.

In fact, there are cases where By-Laws are unnecessary to the corporate existence and to the valid exercise of corporate powers. The Corporation Code does not expressly provide for the effects of non-filing of By-Laws. However, these have been rectified by Section 6 of PD 902-A which provides that SEC shall possess the power to suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of corporations upon failure to file By-Laws within the required period. This shows that there must be notice and hearing before a corporation is dissolved for failure to file its By-Laws. Even assuming that the existence of a ground, the penalty is not necessarily revocation, but may only be suspension.

Case Digest: PURITA BERSABAL VS HON JUDGE SERFIN SALVADOR

PURITA BERSABAL VS HON JUDGE SERFIN SALVADOR

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS

On March 23, 1972, petitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge of August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971, and March 15, 1972 and to compel said respondent Judge to decide petitioner's perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and respondents.

Tan That and Ong Pin Tee filed an ejectment suit against Bersabal in Caloocan City. The rendered decision on November 25, 1970, was appealed by Bersabal. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent court (of Hon. Salvador) issued an order which required the Clerk of Court to transmit within 15 days of receipt the transcripts of stenographic notes and for the counsels of both parties to file their respective memoranda within 30 days upon receipt. Afterwhich, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.

Bersabal received the order on April 17, 1971. The transcript of stenographic notes not yet been submitted, Bersabal then filed on May 5, 1971, an EX-PARTE MOTION TO SUBMIT MEMORANDUM WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF SUBMISSION which was granted on May 7, 1971. However, before Bersabal received the notice, Salvador issued an August 4, 1971, order stating that the defendant-appellant (Bersabal) failed top rosecute her appeal

ISSUE

WON the respondent court can dismiss the case on the mere failure of the petitioner to file her memorandum.

RULING

NO. RA 296 states that the parties may submit memoranda if requested. With the use of the word “may”, the party has an option not to submit the needed memorandum since the word is not mandatory but rather, discretionary. However, the Court pointed out that the respondent court should not dismiss the appeal due to the failure of the petitioner to submit a memorandum but dismiss the petition based on facts available to it. Thus, the Court set aside the decision of the respondent court and ordered it to decide the case base on the merits of the case.

Case Digest: FULE vs. CA, G.R. No. 79094

FULE vs. CA, G.R. No. 79094, June 22, 1988

Subject: Statutory Construction

FACTS

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court.

At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence.  At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts.

The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant. On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE

Whether or not CA erred in the affirming RTC’s decision convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.

RULING

YES, CA erred in affirming RTC’s decision.

Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]).

In this case, Rule 118, Section 4 provides that “Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.” The use of the term "shall" further emphasize its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.

Case Digest: DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, et.al., vs. SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, et.al., G.R. No. 106719

DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, et.al., vs. SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, et.al., G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993

Subject: Statutory Construction 

FACTS

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the suspension of petitioners. The petition also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner.

The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General contends that assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend erring public officials and employees who are working in other departments and offices, the questioned order remains null and void for his failure to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law.

The Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension himself.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

RULING

Yes.

Under the principle of construction (or interpretation) of statutes and other documents, Noscitor a sociis, the meaning of words should be identified by reference to other words in the context of which they appear.

In this case, when the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees, it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.