Case Digest: Dimarucot vs People G.R. No. 183975

Dimarucot vs People G.R. No. 183975, September 20, 2010

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 98-M-98 for Frustrated Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, under the following Information:

That on or about the 18th day of August, 1997, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an iron pipe and with intent to kill one Angelito Rosini y Go, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and hit with the said iron pipe the said Angelito Rosini y Go, hitting him on his head, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries, which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Angelito Rosini y Go, thus performing all acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Angelito Rosini y Go which prevented his death.

After trial, on September 11, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner of frustrated homicide, and sentencing him as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding accused GREGORIO aka GEORGE DIMARUCOT y GARCIA liable of (sic) the lesser offense of Frustrated Homicide, this Court hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum, of imprisonment.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,8 his counsel admitting that he was at fault in failing to file the appellant’s brief due to "personal problems emanating from his [counsel’s] wife’s recent surgical operation." It was thus prayed that the CA allow petitioner to file his appellant’s brief which counsel undertook to submit within seven (7) days or until October 4, 2007. By Resolution9 dated November 27, 2007, the CA, finding the allegations of petitioner unpersuasive and considering that the intended appellant’s brief was not at all filed on October 4, 2007, denied the motion for reconsideration. As per Entry of Judgment, the Resolution of August 29, 2007 became final and executory on January 4, 2008.10

On May 8, 2008, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (1) To Reconsider August 29, 2007 Resolution, (2) To Expunge The Same From Book Of Entries Of Judgment, and (3) To Give Accused-Appellant A Final Period Of Thirty Days To File Appellant’s Brief. Petitioner reiterated that his failure to file the appeal brief was solely the fault of his lawyer who is reportedly suffering from personal problems and depression. He also cited his advanced age (he will turn 76 on May 30, 2008) and medical condition (hypertension with cardiovascular disease and pulmonary emphysema), attaching copies of his birth certificate, medical certificate and certifications from the barangay and church minister.11

In the assailed Resolution dated July 23, 2008, the CA denied the omnibus motion holding that petitioner is bound by the mistakes and negligence of his counsel, such personal problems of a counsel emanating from his wife’s surgical operation are not considered mistake and/or negligence contemplated under the law as to warrant reconsideration of the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal for failure to file appellant’s brief. Thus, when appellant did not file a petition before this Court to assail the validity of the August 29, 2007 and November 27, 2007 resolutions, the August 29, 2007 resolution attained finality and entry of judgment thereof is in order.12

ISSUE

Whether or not Dimarucot’s counsel acted negligently.

RULING

Yes.

Under the code of professional responsibility, A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and negligence of his lawyer allegedly beset with personal problems and emotional depression. The negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client.18 There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s property or liberty through a technicality. However, in this case, we find no reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule.19 The admitted inability of his counsel to attend fully and ably to the prosecution of his appeal and other sorts of excuses should have prompted petitioner to be more vigilant in protecting his rights and replace said counsel with a more competent lawyer. Instead, petitioner continued to allow his counsel to represent him on appeal and even up to this Court, apparently in the hope of moving this Court with a fervent plea for relaxation of the rules for reason of petitioner’s age and medical condition. Verily, diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from their clients.

Negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the appellant’s brief within the reglementary period. The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.

Case Digest: US vs Ballena, G.R. No. L-6294

US vs Ballena, G.R. No. L-6294, February 10, 1911

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

Leoncio Ballena, a provincial fiscal in Masbate, was charged with crime of subordination of perjury. The case stemmed from the testimony of Ana Ramirez, who was called as a witness in a homicide case against Ciriaco Pellejera. Ramirez testified that her husband died of fever and that she observed no contusions or other injuries on his body. However, it was later revealed that Ramirez had previously testified under oath that her husband had been beaten to death by Pellejera.

In the trial of perjury case against Ana, Estefania Barruga, mother of the defendant Ana, was a witness for the defendant, and at the instigation of one Leoncio Ballena she testified that the fiscal, Señor Bailon, at the time he was in Dimasalang making the investigation into the cause of the death of Ana's husband, attempted to rape her daughter Ana, and asked for the hand of the girl in marriage, but she did not desire to accept this proposition of the fiscal because he was a married man.

From there, the fiscal filed an information in the CFI of Masbate against the said Leoncio Ballena, charging him with the crime of subornation of perjury. After trial, the defendant was found guilty.  From this judgment, the defendant appealed and insists that the testimony by given by Estefania Barruga in that perjury case was immaterial to the issues involved therein. If this contention be true, the defendant is not guilty.

ISSUE

Whether or not the testimony of Barruga material to the issues involved in that criminal case against her daughter for perjury.

RULING

Yes, it is material.

Under the law, the crime of perjury is committed by any person who shall knowingly make untruthful statements or make an affidavit, upon any material matter and required by law.

In this case, the defendant strongly insisted that witness Barruga testifying that the fiscal committed those acts would be the only way to save her daughter from imprisonment. Materiality is an essential element in the crime of perjury. It, therefore, necessarily follows that materiality is likewise an indispensable requisite in the crime of subornation of perjury, as the latter is derived from the former. Looking into materiality of the testimonies made by the witnesses and circumstances surrounding the criminal case against Pellejera, the perjury case against Ana, and the current subordination case against Ballena, SC held that defendant Ballena, not only knowingly and willfully induced this witness to swear falsely, but he did so maliciously, as it appears from the record that he was an enemy of the fiscal at that time, the fiscal having prosecuted him previous to this trial. Hence, SC affirmed Ballena's conviction of subordination of perjury.

Case Digest: People vs Manigbas, 109 Phil 469(1960), G.R. Nos. L-10352-53

People vs Manigbas, 109 Phil 469(1960), G.R. Nos. L-10352-53, September 30, 1960

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

On July 9, 1954, Manigbas and his men gathered at the house of Catalino Ramos in barrio Macalamcam, Rosario. Manigbas told his men that Esteban de Guzman, the Chief of Police of Rosario, must be killed because he was responsible for the conviction and sentence to double life imprisonment of their "boss" Isaac Farol. Manigbas then called for volunteers who would be the trigger men.

Marcial Macalintal, Lope de Torres, and Amado Ramos responded and volunteered to perform the job. With the exception of Miguel Almario and Catalino Ramos, who remained behind, Manigbas and his men (composed of Tomas Carandang, Iluminado Landicho, Isabelo Egar, Alejandro Zuño, Ben Mercado, Melecio Sison, Eugenio Mendoza alias Eugenio Hernandez, and Eliseo Carandang) went to the house of Esteban de Guzman and shot him dead.

The men were arrested and charged with murder. They all pleaded not guilty. At trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Tomas Carandang, who had been a member of Manigbas's commando unit. Carandang testified that he had witnessed the planning and execution of the murder of Esteban de Guzman. The defense argued that Carandang's testimony was unreliable because he had been promised leniency in exchange for his testimony. The defense also argued that the prosecution had not presented any physical evidence linking the men to the crime. The trial court found the men guilty of murder and sentenced them to death. The men appealed their convictions to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the confessions of Eliseo Carandang, Eugenio Mendoza, Modesto Leviste, and Isabelo Egar were admissible in evidence. 

RULING

No. The accused argued that the confessions were inadmissible because they were obtained through coercion. They argued that the accused were threatened with physical harm and that they were promised leniency if they confessed.

The prosecution argued that the confessions were voluntary. They argued that the accused were not threatened or promised anything in exchange for their confessions. The Supreme Court held that the confessions were admissible in evidence. The Court found that there was no evidence that the accused were coerced into confessing. The Court also found that the accused were not promised anything in exchange for their confessions.

In this case, the Supreme Court's decision has been criticized by some legal scholars. Some scholars have argued that the Court's decision makes it too easy for the prosecution to obtain confessions from suspects.

Case Digest: In Re Montague &Dominguez, # Phil 577 (1904), G.R. No. 1107

In Re Montague &Dominguez, G.R. No. 1107, April 2, 1904

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

On or about the 15th day of November, 1902, the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands presented to the Supreme Court of said Islands a petition, and on or about January 15, 1903, a supplemental petition, alleging that Augustus A. Montagne and Frank E. Dominguez were practicing attorneys at law in the courts of said Islands, and were members of the firm of lawyers known as Montagne & Dominguez; and in said petition and supplemental petition the said Attorney-General charged said lawyers and said firm with having violated their oaths of office as attorneys at law and with failure to faithfully perform the duties of their office as such attorneys toward their clients.

This evidence is so voluminous that nothing more can be incorporated in the space given us to this opinion than a brief reference to it, and even that reference is to be confined to the facts of four of the most serious of the charges against the respondents, viz, the "Balmori" charge, the hacienda "Esperanza" charge, the "Cordona" charge, and the "Sarmiento" charge. These charges, and a brief statement of the evidence to sustain them, are as follows:

1) That the respondents accepted employment in February 1902, to represent one Felix Balmori in a criminal case, on appeal to the Supreme Court, receiving a retainer in said case; and that after entering upon such employment and accepting a fee pursuant thereto, they abandoned and deserted their said client’s case, to his great prejudice;

2) That they entered into a contract of employment with thousands of Filipinos in the Province of Pangasinan, in December, 1901, to represent said inhabitants in a suit or suits involving the title and possession to a large tract of land, and, after accepting retainers from their said clients, and rendering certain professional services in connection with such suits, they deserted and abandoned their clients' cases at a critical time, in violation of their contract, and to the great injury of such clients;

3) That they were retained in October 1901, to defend one Juan Cardona, who was then held as a prisoner on a criminal charge in the Province of Tarlac. The accused received from Cardona a retainer in his case and afterwards deserted him and failed to appear for him in court when his case was called for trial;

4) That they undertook, in November, 1901, the defense of one Ramon Sarmiento, who was charged with the crimes of estafa and falsification, and who was imprisoned on those charges in Manila; that though they were paid 500 pesos for their services, they subsequently, on an order of the court, obtained possession of 300 pesos which had been deposited in court as the money of said Sarmiento, and retained said sum of 300 pesos and appropriated it to their own use and benefit, against the instructions of their said client and to his injury;

5) That in seven other cases, called the " Cuyapo " case, the " Pearsons " case, the " Dorr " case, the " Gleason " case, the " Finnick " case, the " Quiao " case, and the " Mauline " case, the accused, as such attorneys, at various times mentioned in said petitions, after being employed and retained by clients, and after, receiving fees from their clients, abandoned their cases, and failed and neglected to render such faithful services for said clients as the law required.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondents should be disbarred. 

RULING

SC held that there should be added to these latter five charges those against the respondents in the " Pearson " case and in the " Mauline " case, thus making in all seven charges, no one of which is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment, and these seven charges are therefore dismissed.

Articles 356 and 357 of the Penal Code provide, in effect, for the punishment by a fine of an attorney who maliciously abuses his profession, or by inexcusable ignorance or negligence prejudices his client; and provide for punishment by-fine and suspension, in case an attorney having been retained to defend the cause of one party, subsequently without his consent, defends the opposite side in the same action.

Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer, by the Supreme Court, for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for violation of the oaths prescribed in section 18, or for the willful disobedience of any lawful order of the Supreme Court or Courts of First Instance, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party, to an action or proceeding without authority so to do.

It will be noticed that under article 356 of the Penal Code the penalty for a violation of that article is a fine only; and, under article 357, a fine and suspension may be imposed only for one cause, viz, when an attorney is retained by one party and subsequently, and without the consent of that party, defends the opposite side in the same action.

In re Percy (36 N. Y., 651) the court went so far as to hold that inasmuch as the right to admission to practice law depended on good moral character, joined with requisite learning, this character should be preserved after admission; and that where the acts of an attorney were such as to destroy his credibility and character, the court had authority to disbar him.

Inasmuch as in the case at bar the charges and proofs do not show that the practices of the respondents constituted the gravest offends, we are inclined to take a lenient view of the charges. While we can not excuse the respondents, yet we are of opinion that total disbarment would be too severe a penalty for their acts.

The court, therefore, is of opinion that the respondents, Augustus A. Montagne and Frank E. Dominguez, should be suspended from the practice of their profession as lawyers in these Islands for a term of one year.

Case Digest: US vs Laranja, 21 Phil 500, G.R. No. 6789

US vs Laranja, 21 Phil 500 (1912), G.R. No. 6789, February 16, 1912

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

Laranja and four or five companions went to the house of one Candoy on the night of November 1910. These men arrived at the house on the night and together with the people living in said house, began singing and drinking. A quarrel and fight ensued which resulted in the death of Candoy and Ando. Criminal complaints were filed before the CFI against this appellants and a certain Iyon, charged them with the crime of homicide. The latter was tried first. When the case against the appellant was called, an agreement with reference to admitting the testimony taken in the case against Iyon was entered into by counsel for the defendant and the provincial fiscal.

Attorney Lozano’s position in assisting the prosecution in the case against Iyon was that of showing that Iyon was the guilty party and that the killing of Ando was not justifiable. In defending Calixto, it was the duty of attorney, to show, if it could be done, that Candoy was the aggressor and not Calixto. The testimony which was used to convict Iyon was incorporated by stipulation of the parties bodily into the case against this appellant.

ISSUE

Whether or not Attorney de officio, Mr. Lozano was disqualified from representing the appellant in the trial court.

RULING

No.

Court ruled that “It is said the counsel for respondent was counsel assigned to him by the court and may not have been counsel of his choice. We do not know how the fact was, but we know it is customary to allow the respondent to choose for himself. But however that may be, the counsel acted for the respondent without objection, and without complaint that he did not do the best he could for him”.

In this case, the record in the Iyon case was admitted as evidence on the express stipulation of the parties. The court below had no discretion. To hold that that evidence was inadmissible puts the trial court in the position described by Judge Cooley in the quotation above. If the court admitted the evidence it was subject, according to the theory of counsel for the appellant, to be charged with violating the defendant’s constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and of admitting incompetent evidence. If the court had excluded such evidence, the defendant would have been entitled to have the conviction set aside for error involved in excluding from the case evidence whose admissibility was agreed upon by all, and which the defendant himself, through his counsel, expressly asked to have admitted as essential to his proper defense. In other words, the court would be reversed if it did and reversed if it did not.

Case Digest: Cobb-Perez vs Lantin, 24 SCR 291(1968)

Cobb-Perez vs Lantin, 24 SCR 291(1968)

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

The case involved a judgment creditor, Ricardo Hermoso, who obtained a final and executory judgment against Damaso Perez for the sum of P10,000. Hermoso then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against the conjugal assets of Damaso and his wife, Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez.

The trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of execution against the conjugal assets. Cobb-Perez filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, arguing that the conjugal assets are not liable for the personal debt of Damaso. The counsels of the petitioner have repeatedly caused the delay of the simple execution of sum of money and have availed themselves of suggested remedies available to them.

ISSUE

Whether or not the counsels of the petitioner have caused delay in the execution of the order by the court.

RULING

No.

Under Canon 12.04 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.

In this case, from the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a stratagem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid. Hence, the counsels of the petitioners are guilty of delaying the execution of justice.

Case Digest: Tan Tek Beng vs David, 126 SCRA 389(1983)

Tan Tek Beng vs David, 126 SCRA 389(1983)

Subject: Basic Legal Ethics

FACTS

Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer, has had an agreement with Timoteo David, a lawyer, as documented by a letter made by David with terms and condition that reads: (1) All commission/Attorney’s fees fom the clients supplied by Tan will be divided 50-50 between them; (2) David will not deal directly with their clients without Tan’s consent; (3) Tan will be collecting and keeping the said fees/advances; and, (4) Other clients who are related to Tan and are contacted through him will be his clients.

This agreement was agreed by the parties but their business relationship did not last due to accusation and double-cross. Because of the allege breach of agreement Tan accused David to Pres. Asst. Zamora, Office of Civil Relations and to Supreme Court. This case was sent to Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

ISSUE

Whether or not a disciplinary action should be taken against David.

RULING

Yes.

Under the canons of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar Association, Division of Fees - No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility; Intermediaries - The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer’s responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer’s relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client; Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. — A lawyer should accept no compensation, commissions, rebates or other advantages from others without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure." (Appendix, Malcolm, Legal Ethics).

Where in the agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients, the Court held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending Sec. 21 of Act No. 190). That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 33 Phil. 37, 42).

The commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar Association. "Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743). We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but because David should have known better.